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Abstract
We study the distributional consequences of trade in a world with two industries and two
heterogeneous factors of production. Productivity in each production unit reects the ability of
the manager and the abilities of the workers, with complementarity between the two. We begin
by examining the forces that govern the sorting of worker and manager types to industries, and
the matching of workers and managers within industries. We then consider how changes in
relative output prices generated by changes in the trading environment a¤ect sorting, matching,
and the distributions of wages and salaries. We distinguish three mechanisms that govern the
e¤ects of trade on income distribution: trade increases demand for all types of the factor used
intensively in the export sector; trade benets those types of a factor that have a comparative
advantage in the export sector; and trade induces a re-matching of workers and managers within
both sectors, which benets the more able types of the factor that achieves improved matches.
Keywords: heterogeneous labor, matching, sorting, productivity, wage distribution, inter-
national trade.
JEL Classication: F11, F16
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1 Introduction
How does international trade a¤ect a countrys income distribution? This age-old question has been
the subject of a voluminous theoretical literature dating back at least to Ohlin (1933), Haberler
(1936), Viner (1937), and of course Stolper and Samuelson (1941). But, until recently, research
has focused almost exclusively on the relative earnings of a small number of aggregate (or homo-
geneous) factors of production. One can think of this research as addressing the determinants
of between-occupation or between-skill-groupdistribution. There has also been a between-
industrycomponent to this line of inquiry, as reected in the work by Jones (1971), Mayer (1974)
and Mussa (1974) on models with sector-specicfactors of production.
However, between-occupation and between-industry wage variation tell only part of the in-
equality story. Research using household-level data nds that within occupation-and-industry wage
variation or within skill-group-and-industry variation contributes at least as much as does between-
group variation to the overall level of earnings inequality in the United States, Germany, Sweden,
and Brazil.1 Moreover, changes in within-group distributions account for a signicant portion of
the recent trends in wage inequality. While only the research on Brazil attempts to attribute some
of these trends to changes in the trade environment, the evidence of substantial within-group dis-
persion suggests the need for a richer theoretical framework that incorporates factor heterogeneity
in order to help us understand more fully the e¤ects of globalization on income distribution.
In this paper, we introduce factor heterogeneity into a multi-factor model of resource allocation
in order to study the distributional e¤ects of international trade in ner detail. As in the familiar
Hecksher-Ohlin model, we assume that output is produced by the combined e¤orts of two factors
(or occupations), which we call workers and managers. These factors are employed in two
competitive industries. But here, the inelastic supply of each factor comprises a continuum of
di¤erent types. Firms form production units that bring together a manager of some type with a
group of workers. There are diminishing marginal returns to adding a greater number of workers
to a team with a given manager, as in the standard model. Meanwhile, the productivity of a unit
depends on the type of the manager and the types of the various workers. Firms must choose not
only how many workers and managers to hire, but also what types to employ. Industries may di¤er
both in their factor intensities (as reected in the diminishing returns to workers per manager) and
in the functions that relate productivity to types.
Our model builds not only on Heckscher and Ohlin, but also on Lucas (1978). Lucas assumed
that a rms productivity depends on the ability of its manager (or entrepreneur), but that
agents are equally productive qua workers. His analysis focused on the sizes of production units
as a function of the types of their managers, but he could not address the composition of these
units in terms of manager-worker combinations. Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) extended Lucass
1See, for example, Card et al. (2013) for Germany, Akerman et al. (2013) for Sweden, Helpman (2014) et al. for
Brazil, Mouw and Kalleberg (2010) for the United States, and others.
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approach to allow for heterogeneity of both factors. Like Lucas, they modeled only a single good-
producing industry and so they could not study the e¤ects of relative output prices on factor
rewards. But they contributed a key result that we borrow here, namely a condition for positive
assortative matching of workers and managers. To apply their insights, we posit the existence of
complementarity between worker ability and manager ability in determining the productivity of
production units in each industry. When these complementarities are strong enough, they imply
that rms in an industry will combine better managers with better workers.2
In general equilibrium models with homogeneous factors of production, resource allocation can
be fully described by the quantities of every input hired into each sector. With heterogeneous
factors, the assignment of di¤erent types must also be considered. In such a setting, two important
aspects of resource allocation that a¤ect income distribution concern the sorting of heterogeneous
managers and workers to industries and the matching of managers and workers in production units
within each one. Sorting that is guided by comparative advantage generates endogenous sector
specicity, which partly links workers and managers rewards to the prices of the goods they
produce. Endogenous matching creates an additional channel absent from previous, multi-sector
trade models through which changes in relative prices can a¤ect the distribution of factor rewards.
If the complementarities between manager and worker ability levels are strong enough to determine
the composition of the production teams that form in general equilibrium, then changes in relative
prices typically induce rematching of managers and workers in each industry. We will be interested
in describing the rematching that results from an improvement in a countrys terms of trade and
in deriving the implications of such changes in the trade environment for within occupation-and-
industry income inequality.3
We are not the rst to study the implications of sorting and matching for income distribution.
However, previous authors have considered the two forces only in isolation. For example, Ohnsorge
and Treer (2007) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) studied the links between trade and income
distribution in an assignment model with heterogeneous workers and many sectors, but with a
linear production function. In this setting, workers sort to sectors, but do not match with any
other factors.4 Yeaple (2005) and Sampson (2014) allow for matching between heterogeneous
workers and rms that have access to di¤erent technologies. These authors too adopt a linear
production function, but since their rms produce di¤erentiated products in a world of monopolistic
competition, the hiring of additional labor generates decreasing returns in terms of revenue, and
so they can analyze the sizes of production units. Our model incorporates the forces found in
these earlier papers, but also identies a novel and important interplay between matching and
sorting; changes in relative prices generate shifts in the margins of factor sorting, which alter the
2See Garicano and Hubbard (2012) for direct evidence of positive assortative matching between managers and
workers in the U.S. legal services industry and Fox (2009) for indirect evidence of such matching across a range of
U.S. and Swedish industries.
3Krishna et al. (2014) report evidence of an endogenous reassignment of workers to rms following the Brazilian
trade reform of 1991. They conclude based on this evidence that [e]ndogenous matching of workers with rms is
thus crucial in determining wage outcomes for workers in open economies(p.252).
4See Ru¢ n (1988) for an antecedent of this approach.
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composition of types in each industry and so force a rematching of factor types.
In the next section, we revisit the Brazilian data examined by Helpman et al. (2014) in order to
provide some motivating observations for the subsequent theoretical analysis. We nd a strongly
positive correlation between the mean wage of male workers employed in an industry and the mean
salary of male managers and professionals employed in the same industry, suggestive of positive
assortative matching across industries of worker and manager types. We use this observation later
to guide our emphasis among the various sorting outcomes that can arise in our model. We also nd
signicant changes in within-industry worker and manager earnings distribution over an eight-year
period that spans the major Brazilian trade liberalization of 1991.
In Section 3, we lay out our general equilibrium model of competitive resource allocation with
two heterogeneous factors of production. As already mentioned, the model extends the familiar
Heckscher-Ohlin framework to allow for a continuum of types of both factors. In each of the two
industries, the productivity of a production unit that includes a manager and some endogenously-
chosen number of workers is an increasing, log-supermodular function of the abilityof the manager
and the ability levels of the associated workers. We take the relative output price as exogenous,
but use it to represent the countrys trading environment.
Section 4 derives the equilibrium conditions for prot-maximization, factor-market clearing,
and wage and salary determination. We discuss the equilibrium sorting of workers and managers
to industries, rst for a case in which productivity is a constant-elasticity function of the ability of
the manager and the abilities of the workers, and then for a case with stronger complementarities,
namely when productivity is a strictly log-supermodular function of the types. In either case,
sorting by each factor is guided by a cross-industry comparison of the ratio of the elasticity of
productivity with respect to ability to the elasticity of output with respect to factor quantity.
When complementarities are strong, the elasticities of productivity with respect to ability reect
the matches that take place, and so the sorting by each factor depends on the choices made by
the other factor. After describing the sorting conditions, we dene a threshold equilibrium as
one in which sorting of each factor is fully described by a single cuto¤ such that all workers with
ability above the cuto¤ are employed in one industry and the remainder are employed in the other,
and similarly for managers. Several propositions provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of
a threshold equilibrium, rst allowing for the possibility that high-ability workers and managers
might not sort to the same sector, but then focusing on an equilibrium with positive assortative
matching across industries.
After characterizing in Section 5 the matches that form between exogenously given sets of worker
types and manager types and discussing how exogenous expansion of these sets induces rematching
that has clear implications for income inequality, we turn in Section 6 to the main task at hand. Here
we ask, how do changes in the trading environment, as reected in a countrys terms of trade, a¤ect
earnings inequality between occupations, between industries, and within occupation and industry.
We begin again with the case of constant-elasticity (or Cobb-Douglas) productivity functions, which
generates results that are instructive even if unrealistic. We show that in this environment, an
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increase in the relative price of a countrys export good generates between-occupation redistribution
that is reminiscent of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and between-industry redistribution that is
reminiscent of the Ricardo-Viner model with sector-specic factors, but it has no a¤ect on within
occupation-and-industry inequality. The complementarities between managers and workers are not
strong enough in the Cobb-Douglas case to determine a unique pattern of matching, and the relative
productivities of di¤erent factor types in an industry are independent of the matches that take place.
With the stronger complementarities that are present when the productivity functions are strictly
log supermodular, the matching pattern in general equilibrium is uniquely determined. Then
endogenous rematching generates predictable changes in within occupation-and-industry income
distributions.
In Section 6.2.1, we consider the distributional e¤ects of price changes in an initial equilibrium in
which the best workers and the best managers sort to opposite sectors. Although this conguration
seems less empirically relevant than the alternative based on the evidence for Brazil (and also
Sweden), the forces at work are easiest to understand in this case. An increase in the relative price
of the good produced by the higher-ability types of workers and the lower-ability types of managers,
for example, attracts to the industry marginal workers who are less able and marginal managers
who are more able than those who are employed there initially. This results in match upgrading
for all workers initially in the expanding sector and for those who remain in the contacting sector,
which in turn spells a rise in within-occupation-and-industry inequality. The outcome for managers
is just the opposite.
Finally, in Section 6.2.2, we take on the case that probably is most empirically relevant, namely
one in which the most able workers and the most able managers sort to the same industry. We
show that if factor intensities are similar in the two industries, a change in relative price must
increase within-occupation-and-industry inequality for one factor and reduce it for the other. If,
instead, factor intensities di¤er substantially across sectors, then a richer set of outcomes is possible.
For example, an increase in the relative price of the worker-intensive good raises within-industry
inequality among workers in the labor-intensive industry while reducing within-industry inequality
among those in the manager-intensive industry.
Section 7 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Some Motivating Observations
We aim to provide a simple analytical framework that can shed light on the distributional im-
plications of globalization in a world with a broad range of worker types. Our motivation comes
in part from several recent ndings in the empirical literature on earnings. Researchers such as
Autor et al. (2008) and Kopczuk et al. (2010) have emphasized that trends in income inequality
over the last decade cannot be well summarized by a single summary statistic, such as the relative
wage of skilled versus unskilled workers or the college wage premium. Rather, in several countries,
including the United Stages, inequality has been rising at the top end of the wage distribution, but
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constant or even declining at the bottom end of the distribution, generating what has been termed
a hollowing outof the middle class. Also, Helpman et al. (2014) and Akerman et al. (2013) have
documented that within-industry variation accounts for a large part of the cross-sectional evolution
of wage inequality, even after controlling at a detailed level for workersoccupations. In Brazil,
for example, the authors used a classication system that allows for 12 manufacturing sectors and
more than 300 occupations and found that more than half of the change in wage inequality between
1986 and 1995 occurred within sectors and occupations. Together, these ndings point to the need
for a framework that allows for multiple worker types and that incorporates links between trade
and relative wages for workers employed in the same occupation and industry.
To set the stage for our theoretical analysis, we draw on the set of linked employer-employee
relationships that were surveyed by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor in its Relação Anual de Infor-
maçoes Sociais (RAIS) and studied previously by Helpman et al. (2014). Our purpose in re-visiting
these data is not to provide a set of targets that will be explained by our theory, but rather to
highlight the rich pattern of outcomes that exist in reality and to establish some stylized facts that
we can use to focus attention among the several casesthat our model can generate.
We examine distributions of wages and salaries in twelve Brasileiro de Geograa e Estatistica
(IBGE) industry categories for the years 1986 and 1994.5 These data represent labor-market
outcomes before and after the major Brazilian trade liberalization of 1991, but before the impact was
felt of the substantial stabilization program that Brazil undertook in 1994. Our model distinguishes
two factors of production that we shall call managersand workers,and so we compute earnings
distributions in the Brazilian manufacturing industries separately for occupations classied in the
Classicação Brasileira de Ocupações Category 1 (professional and managerial labor) and those
in Categories 2-5 (skilled white-collar, unskilled white-collar, skilled blue-collar and unskilled-blue-
collar labor).
In gure 1, we plot the log of the mean earnings for male managers and professionals in 1994
against the log of the mean wage for male workers, for each of the twelve manufacturing sectors.6
Apparently, the correlation across sectors between the mean earnings of managers and the mean
wage of workers is strongly positive. In our later discussion, we will interpret this positive correlation
to suggest the greater empirical relevance of circumstances in which the more able (and thus higher
paid) managers sort to the same industry as do the more able workers, as compared to circumstances
in which the more able managers sort to the same industry as the less able workers.7 For future
reference, we record
Observation 1 There is a strong positive correlation between the mean wage of male managers
employed in a Brazilian industry and the mean wage of male workers employed in the industry.
5Table 2 includes a list of the industries and their sector numbers.
6The plot for wages and salaries in 1986 is qualitatively similar.
7Figure A1 in the Appendix plots log of mean wages for Swedish managers and workers in 2004 in 14 manufacturing
industries and shows a similar strong positive correlation. We thank Anders Akerman for computing these means
from the Statistics Sweden database that is described in Akerman et al. (2013).
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Figure 1: Variation across manufacturing industries of log mean salary of male managers and log
mean wage of male workers in Brazil, 1994. Source: own calculations.
Male Workers Male Managers
Industry No. 1986 1994 1986 1994
Non-metallic mineral products 2 0.324 0.381 0.308 0.376
Metallic products 3 0.252 0.276 0.219 0.260
Machinery, equipment and instruments 4 0.240 0.266 0.226 0.224
Electrical and telecommunications equipment 5 0.261 0.294 0.203 0.207
Transport equipment 6 0.192 0.236 0.163 0.192
Wood products and furniture 7 0.238 0.331 0.392 0.423
Paper and paperboard, and publishing and printing 8 0.301 0.326 0.319 0.340
Rubber, tobacco, leather and fur 9 0.309 0.344 0.295 0.345
Chemical and pharmaceutical products 10 0.358 0.353 0.247 0.286
Apparel and textiles 11 0.275 0.309 0.347 0.393
Footwear 12 0.259 0.350 0.335 0.349
Food, beverages, and ethyl alcohol 13 0.268 0.345 0.411 0.398
All manufacturing industries 0.318 0.364 0.290 0.329
Table 1: Theil index of inequality by manufacturing industry
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Table 1 reports the Theil index of income inequality separately for male workers and male
managers and professionals in 1986 and in 1994, for each of the 12 manufacturing industries.8 In
Table 2, we provide two decompositions of the these indexes for each year and for the change
between them. The top part of the table shows a separate decomposition for each occupational
group (i.e., workers and managers) into a component that represents dispersion within industries
and one that represents dispersion between industries.9 The bottom part of the table provides a
decomposition of inequality for all male workers and managers in manufacturing taken together into
components for within occupation and industryand between occupation and industry.We see
that, in either case, the within component accounts for the largest share of the overall inequality
in each year, as well as the majority of the change that occurred during the period that spanned
the trade reform. We record this nding in
Observation 2 Within-industry inequality accounts for a majority of the income inequality for
male workers and for male managers in Brazil in 1986 and 1994, and for a majority of the
changes in inequality between 1986 and 1994. Within-occupation-and-industry inequality
accounts for a majority of the income inequality for male workers and managers as a group
in 1986 and 1994, and for a majority of the change in inequality between 1986 and 1994.
In Figure 2, we plot the change in the Theil index for workers between 1986 and 1994 against the
change in the Theil index for managers and professionals. The numbers in the gure again represent
the di¤erent industries, in accordance with the labels provided in Table 2. The gure reveals a
negative correlation of -0.20 between the changes in inequality for workers and that for managers; in
industries where the spread in the salaries of workers increased greatly, that for managers generally
increased little, or even decreased. We note
8We compute the Theil index of inequality in group k as
Tk =
1
Nk
NkX
i=1

yi
yk
 ln yi
yk

where Nk is the number of individuals in group k, yi is the income of individual i, and yk is the mean income among
all individuals in group k.
9For a set of groups k = 1; : : : ;K, the overall Theil index is
T =
1
N
X
k
X
i
yik
y
ln
yik
y
where yik is the income of worker i in group k, N =
P
kNk and y is the mean income. We compute the within
componentas
Twithin =
X
k
skTk
where sk =
Nk yk
N y
is the income share of group k:The between component is
Tbetween =
X
k
sk ln
yk
y
,
so that T = Twithin + Tbetween.
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Male Workers Male Managers
1986 1994 Change 1986 1994 Change
Decomposition:
Within/Between Industry
Total inequality 0.318 0.364 0.045. 0.290 0.329 0.039
Within industry 0.272 0.309 0.038 0.262 0.291 0.029
Between industry 0.047 0.054 0.007 0.028 0.038 0.009
Male Workers and Managers
1986 1994 Change
Decomposition:
Within/Between Industry and Occupation
Total inequality 0.423 0.467 0.043
Within occupation and industry 0.269 0.305 0.036
Between occupation and industry 0.154 0.161 0.007
Table 2: Decomposition of income inequality
Figure 2: Correlation across industries of changes in income inequality for Brazilian workers and
Brazilian Managers
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Observation 3 There is a negative correlation across industries between the change in the Theil
index of earnings inequality between 1986 and 1994 for Brazilian workers and the change in
the Theil index of earnings inequality for Brazilian managers.
Finally, in Figure 3, we associate these changes in inequality for each occupational group with
changes in relative prices over the same period. We use wholesale price data (Indice de Precos
por Atacado) computed by Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) and a concordance and aggregation
to the twelve IGBE industry categories performed by Marc Muendler.10 The top panel in the
gure shows that inequality among workers tended to rise in those industries that experienced an
increase in relative price between 1986 and 1994. The correlation coe¢ cient is 0.25. Meanwhile, the
bottom panel in the gure depicts a negative correlation between the change in the Theil index of
inequality for managers and the evolution of the industrys relative price. In this case, we compute
the correlation coe¢ cient to be -0.45. We make no claim that these correlations represent causal
links between prices and inequality. Still, it is interesting that industry price changes have an
opposite correlation with changes in inequality for the two factors, which we will nd is a general
prediction of our model.
Observation 4 The correlation across industries between the change in relative output price and
the change in income inequality between 1986 and 1994 is positive for Brazilian workers and
negative for Brazilian managers.
We o¤er these observations cautiously. For one thing, we have not attempted to isolate the
inuence of trade liberalization from other forces that may have impacted the wage and salary
distributions in Brazil during the period under consideration. For another, we have not sought to
verify that similar patterns have occurred after trade liberalization or increased exposure to trade in
other countries, especially those with factor endowments similar to those in Brazil. While serious
empirical analysis is beyond the scope of the current paper, the data for Brazil do suggest that
trade impacts di¤erently the earnings of those in an industry and occupation who di¤er in skill and
ability, that within industry-and-occupation redistribution is at least as important as redistribution
between those in di¤erent occupations and industries, that changes in inequality among managers
and workers in an industry are negatively correlated, and that these inequality changes are cor-
related with relative price movements. Finally, the data suggest that greater emphasis should be
placed on parameter congurations that imply sorting of the best managers and the best workers
to the same sectors as compared to parameter congurations that imply otherwise.
10We begin with the IPA-DI series, which has been used for the Brazilian national accounts since 1944. FGV reports
these prices at an FGV-specic industry level. Muendler used an internal crosswalks made available to him by IBGE
to reset those data to the Nivel-100 industry level and then mapped the resulting prices to IGBE subsectors. He
formed aggregates at the 12-industry level of the earnings data using sales data from the 1990 survey of manufacturing
rms (PIA) that is described in Muendler (2004). Finally, we computed price indexes for 1986 and 1994 by averaging
the monthly prices he gave us and constructed relative price changes by dividing the ination in each price series by
the average ination rate. We are very grateful to Marc Muendler for his assistance in all this.
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Figure 3: Correlation across industries of changes in income inequality and changes in relative
prices
3 The Economic Environment
We study an economy that produces and trades two goods. This is a Heckscher-Ohlin economy
with two factors of production that for concreteness we call managers and workers except
that there are many types of each factor. The inelastic supplies of the heterogeneous workers
are represented by a density function LL (qL), where L is the aggregate measure of workers in the
economy and L (qL) is a probability density function (pdf) over worker types, qL. Similarly, the
economy is endowed with a density HH (qH) of managers of type qH , where H is the measure of
managers and H (qH) is the pdf for manager types. For ease of exposition, we take L (qL) and
H (qH) both to be continuous and strictly positive on their respective supports, SL = [qLmin; qLmax]
and SH = [qHmin; qHmax].
We treat factor endowments as exogenous for simplicity, and in order to connect our analysis
with previous studies of trade and factor prices in the spirit of Jones (1965, 1971), Mayer (1974),
Mussa (1974), and others. It might also be interesting to allow for occupational choice, as in
Lucas (1978), or human capital accumulation via education, as in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983).
Of course, other interpretations of the two factors also are possible. For example, if the factors
are labor and capital, one presumably would want to incorporate a choice of investment in
machines of di¤erent types, as in Acemo¼glu (1998).
Competitive rms can enter freely into either industry and access constant-returns-to-scale
technologies. We describe the technology in industry i in terms of the output that can be produced
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by a manager of some type qH when combined with workers of various types. The manager has an
endogenous span of control as in Garicano (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) inasmuch
as she must allocate her xed endowment of attention to the various workers placed under her
control. If the productivity of each worker increases with the attention devoted by the manager,
albeit with diminishing returns, then it generically is optimal for the rm to form production units
that combine a given type of manager with an (endogenous) number of workers of a common type.11
To save on notation, we therefore can describe the technology in sector i in terms of the amount of
potential output xi that can be produced by a unit with one manager of type qH and ` workers of
common type qL, namely
xi =  i (qH ; qL) `
i , 0 < i < 1, for i = 1; 2. (1)
Here,  i (qH ; qL) reects the productivity of the production unit and i is a parameter that
captures the diminishing returns to the size of the workforce that results from an increase in the
managers span of control. Since we allow for di¤erent degrees of diminishing returns in the two
sectors (1 6= 2), the rms in di¤erent industries might nd it optimal to combine a manager with
di¤erent numbers of workers. This gives rise to a possible di¤erence in factor intensities that is
familiar from the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory.12 The new element is the productivity term
 i (qH ; qL), which is a function of the types of each of the factors. We assume that there exists
an ordering of each factor type such that any change in the type index a¤ects productivity in the
same direction in both industries. Without further loss of generality, then, we can choose the order
so that  i (qH ; qL) is strictly increasing in each of its arguments for i = 1 and i = 2. Under this
labeling convention, we refer to qH as the ability of the manager and qL as the ability of the
associated workers.
Importantly, we posit the existence of a complementarity between the ability levels of the
manager and the workers that are employed together in a production unit. More able workers are
more productive than less able workers no matter who is their manager, but the more able workers
are assumed to be relatively more productive compared to their less able counterparts when they
are combined with a more able manager rather than a less able manager.13 Formally, we assume
throughout that  i (qH ; qL) is strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable and we adopt
Assumption 1  i (qH ; qL) is log supermodular for i = 1; 2.
Log supermodularity implies that  i (q
00
H ; q
00
L) = i (q
00
H ; q
0
L)   i (q0H ; q00L) = i (q0H ; q0L) for any q00H > q0H
11The optimality of combining a given type of manager with workers of a common type arises in other contexts in
which the manager has a span of control besides the particular description we o¤er here; see Eeckout and Kircher
(2012). They show that the key assumption for this result is that there is no teamwork or synergy between workers
in the rm, who interact only insofar as they compete for the managers time and attention.
12The assumption of a power function for labor i.e., that the technologies are Cobb-Douglas in factor quantities
is made for expositional convenience; many of our results do not require this assumption, so long as there are no
factor intensity reversals.
13See, for example, Garicano and Hubbard (2012), who study assignment patterns in the U.S. legal services industry.
They nd that the more able partners (managers) team with the more able associates (workers) and argue that their
data are best explained by the existence of complementarity between the managersand workersskill or ability.
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and q00L > q
0
L. Notice that we allow the two industries to di¤er in the strength of the complementar-
ities between factors, which along with the di¤erences in factor intensities will play an important
role in determining the sorting of the factor types to the two industries.
Much of our analysis will be carried out with a slightly stronger version of our assumption about
complementarities, namely
Assumption 10  i (qH ; qL) is strictly log supermodular for i = 1; 2.
In this case, the weak inequality described in the previous paragraph becomes a strong inequality.
We take all factor markets to be perfectly competitive and frictionless. That is, rms can
hire managers and workers of any type at salaries r (qH) and wages w (qL) that vary with ability,
of course, but that the individual rm takes as given. There is no imperfect information about
individualsabilities, no search costs of any sort, and no unemployment. Adding frictions to the
formation of production units would be an interesting extension, but is beyond the scope of the
current paper.14
As in other models with perfect competition, the impact of the trading environment on local
factor prices is conveyed via relative output prices. For example, the opening of trade from autarky
generates an increase in the relative price of a countrys export good. So does a subsequent improve-
ment in its terms of trade. An import tari¤ raises the relative domestic price of a countrys import
good, except under the conditions of the so-called Metzler paradox (Metzler, 1949). The relative
domestic prices in turn determine the equilibrium wage schedule w (qL) and the salary schedule
r (qH). Accordingly, we can study the e¤ects of changes in the trading environment on the earnings
distribution by considering the comparative static changes in the wage and salary schedules that
result from an arbitrary change in relative prices. There is no need to spell out the foreign supply
conditions, the domestic and foreign demand conditions, or the international equilibrium conditions
for our present purposes.15
4 Sorting and Matching of Managers and Workers
In this section, we lay out the conditions for prot maximization and factor-market clearing in
the domestic economy, taking output prices as given. These conditions determine inter alia the
sorting of the di¤erent types of workers and managers to the two industries, the matching of workers
and managers in production units within each sector, and the equilibrium schedules of wages and
salaries. We will characterize the patterns of sorting and matching that can arise in equilibrium
14 In our working paper, Grossman et al. (2013), we allow for directed search by workers in an environment with
unemployment generated by search frictions. In that setting, many results have a similar avor to those derived here,
but trade a¤ects the distribution of employment across workers of di¤erent abilities, as well as the distribution of
wages.
15 In Grossman et al. (2013) we discuss the determinants of the trade pattern in a world with two countries that
share common homothetic demands and common technologies. We considered countries that di¤er in their aggregate
endowments of managers and workers and in their distributions of factor types.
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and describe some properties of the earnings schedules. Discussion of the responses of wages and
salaries to changes in relative prices is deferred until Section 6 below.
Consider a rm in sector i that employs a manager of some type qH . This rm must choose the
type of workers qL and the number of workers ` to combine with the manager, given the output
price and the wage schedule. The rms prot, gross of its salary payment to the manager, is given
by
i (`; qL; qH) = pi i (qH ; qL) `
i   w (qL) ` ,
where pi is the price of good i and w (qL) is the competitive wage paid to a worker with ability qL.
The rst-order condition with respect to ` yields the conditional labor demand,
` (qL; qH) =

ipi i (qH ; qL)
w (qL)
 1
1 i
, (2)
which is the number of workers the rm would hire if it were to employ a manager with ability qH ,
choose workers of type qL; and face the wage schedule w (qL).
Next, we substitute ` (qL; qH) into the expression for i (`; qL; qH) and compute the rst-order
condition with respect to qL. This yields the rms optimal choice of worker type, given the type
of its manager and taking into account the corresponding size of the optimal production unit. The
rst-order condition can be written as
"iL(qH ; qL)
i
= "w(qL) , (3)
where "iL (qH ; qL)  qL [@ i (qH ; qL) =@qL] = i (qH ; qL) is the elasticity of productivity in sector i
with respect to worker ability and "w(qL)  qL [@w (qL) =@qL] =w (qL) is the elasticity of the wage
schedule. Evidently, the rm sets the ratio of the elasticity of output with respect to worker ability
to the elasticity of output with respect to worker quantity equal to the elasticity of the wage
schedule.16 The optimal choice of ability reects the fact that the rm has two ways to expand
output, either by hiring better workers or by hiring more workers. The rate at which wages rise
with ability dictates the appropriate trade-o¤ between the two.
Let qL = mi (qH) denote the solution to (3), if the equation has a unique solution. Then mi (qH)
tells us the type of workers that the rm would combine with a manager of ability qH if it happened
to hire such a manager. For the economy as a whole, the matching function m (qH), if it is well
determined, consists of m1 (qH) for qH 2 QH1 and m2 (qH) for qH 2 QH2, where QHi is the set of
managers that is hired in equilibrium in sector i.
Who are the managers that actually are hired into sector i in equilibrium? Were a rm to
hire a manager with ability qH and pay her the market salary, r (qH), its net prot would be
i (qH) = ~i (qH)  r (qH), where ~i (qH)  maxf`;qLg i (`; qL; qH) is achieved by choosing ` and qL
16This condition is analagous to the ones in Costinot and Vogel (2010) and Sampson (2014), except that those
papers have i = 1, because workers are the only factor of production and output is linear in labor quantity. A
second, heterogeneous factor of production such as we have introduced here is necessary to generate re-matching
within sectors, which in turn is needed to explain changes in within-occupation-and-industry wage distribution.
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according to (2) and (3).17 Note that, in a competitive equilibrium, every rm operating in sector
i breaks even, which implies that i (qH) = 0 for all qH 2 QHi. Note too that the rms in sector j
should not be able to make strictly positive prots by hiring the managers that sort in equilibrium
into sector i, or else they would hire these managers instead. This implies that j (qH)  0 for all
qH 2 QHi, j 6= i. We will return to these zero-prot and optimality conditions below.
4.1 Matching and Sorting with Cobb-Douglas Productivity
It is instructive to begin rst with a special case in which productivity is a constant elasticity
function of the ability of the manager and that of the worker. For this case, we can write
 i (qH ; qL) = q
i
H q
i
L for i = 1; 2; i; i > 0.
For obvious reasons, we shall refer to this as the case of Cobb-Douglas productivity.
The Cobb-Douglas productivity function has several special properties that are important in
this context. First, the function is log supermodular, but it is not strictly log supermodular; it
satises Assumption 1 but not Assumption 10. Second, the elasticity of output with respect to
worker ability, "iL (qH ; qL), is a constant i in this case, and independent of both qH and qL.
We can dene analogously the elasticity of output with respect to manager ability, "iH (qH ; qL) 
qH [@ i (qH ; qL) =@qH ] = i (qH ; qL). This too is a constant, equal to i, in the case of Cobb-Douglas
productivity.
With "iL = i, the rst-order condition (3) for a rms interior choice of worker type in sector i
requires that "w (qL) = i=i. However, with an arbitrary wage schedule, this condition will only be
satised by a nite number (possibly only one) of values of qL. Facing such an arbitrary schedule,
all rms active in an industry would hire one of these nite number of types. Such choices would
not be consistent with full employment of the continuum of worker types that sorts to an industry.
We conclude that, as a requirement for full employment, the wage schedule must have a constant
elasticity 1=1 for the range of workers hired into sector 1 and it must have a constant elasticity
2=2 for the range of workers hired into sector 2. In other words,
w (qL) = wiq
i=i
L for all qL 2 QLi, i = 1; 2; (4)
for some constants, w1 and w2, where QLi is the set of workers hired in sector i. The wage schedule
dictated by (4) makes all rms operating in industry i indi¤erent between the potential employees
in QLi.
Notice that the wage schedule in (4) leaves rms in industry i indi¤erent among the potential
employees in QLi no matter what is the type of their manager. Indeed, the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tivity function makes the relative productivity of any two workers independent of manager type. It
follows that matching of workers and managers is not well determined for the case of Cobb-Douglas
17Of course, this statement assumes that (2) has a unique solution; otherwise, the rm chooses any worker type qL
that maximizes i along with the corresponding quantity, ` (qL; qH).
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Figure 4: Wage Schedule
productivity; any matches between workers in QLi and managers in QHi can be consistent with
equilibrium, provided that the numbers in all production units are consistent with (2) and the
requirements for aggregate factor-market clearing are satised.
Which workers are employed in industry 1 and which in industry 2? Consider Figure 4, which
depicts the qualitative features of the equilibrium wage schedule for the case in which sL  1=1 
2=2 > 0. Once the wage anchors, w1 and w2, have been determined in the general equilibrium,
the solid curve in the gure represent the equilibrium wage schedule that satises (4). The broken
curves show what the wages for di¤erent types of workers would have to be in order to make the
rms in an industry indi¤erent between hiring these types and the types that are actually employed
in equilibrium. The fact that 1=1 > 2=2 implies that the solid curve lies above the broken
curve for industry 2 to the right of the point of intersection, qL, and that the solid curve lies above
the broken curve for industry 1 to the left of the intersection point. In equilibrium, the rms in
industry 1 are willing to hire any workers with ability above qL, but not those with ability below
this level. Meanwhile, the rms in industry 2 are willing to hire any workers with ability below qL,
but not those with ability above this level. Evidently, those with ability above qL sort to industry
1 and those with ability below qL sort to industry 2, and the marginal workers with ability equal to
qL are paid the same wage by both sectors. Sorting of workers is guided by sL, the cross-industry
comparison of the ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to ability to the elasticity of
output with respect to quantity.
What about the managers? In the appendix we show that the zero prot condition, i (qH) = 0
for all qH 2 QHi, together with (2), (3) and (4), imply that
r (qH) = riq
i=(1 1)
H for all qH 2 QHi, i = 1; 2; (5)
where ri is a constant analogous to wi.18 Then the condition that j (qH)  0 for all qH 2 QHi,
18The constants, w1 and w2, are determined along with qL by a pair of labor-market clearing conditions for the
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j 6= i; (i.e., that rms do not want to hire the managers employed in the opposite sector) dictates
the sorting pattern for managers: If sH  1= (1  1)   2= (1  2) > 0, then managers with
ability above some cuto¤ qH sort to sector 1 and those with ability below q

H sort to sector 2;
otherwise, the sorting pattern is just the opposite. Notice that the sorting pattern for managers
can be understood similarly to that for workers. Constant returns to scale implies that the elasticity
of output with respect to the number of managers in sector i is 1  i. So, the sorting of managers
is guided by a cross-industry comparison of the ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect
to manager ability to the elasticity of output with respect to the number of managers.19
The case of Cobb-Douglas productivity generates what we will call a threshold equilibrium; the
sorting pattern in general equilibrium is characterized by a pair of boundary points, qL and q

H ,
such that all workers with ability above qL sort to some sector and all workers with ability below
qL sort to the other, and similarly all managers with ability above q

H sort to some sector while
those with ability below qH sort to the other.
20 We note for future reference that there are two
possible types of threshold equilibrium that can emerge. If sL and sH share the same sign, then
the most able workers and the most able managers sort to the same sector. We will refer to this
below as an HH=LL equilibrium, to convey that the high typesof both factors sort together, as
do the low types.Alternatively, if sL and sH are opposite in sign, then the more able managers
sort to the same sector as the less able workers. We will refer to such an outcome as an HL=LH
equilibrium. Recall Observation 1 in Section 2, which suggests that the HH=LL equilibrium may
be the more empirically relevant of the two.
4.2 Matching and Sorting with Strictly Log Supermodular Productivity
Armed with an understanding of the knife-edge case of Cobb-Douglas productivity, we turn to
a case with stronger complementarities between manager and worker abilities that arises under
Assumption 10.
When the productivity function  i (qH ; qL) for i = 1; 2 is strictly log supermodular, the argu-
ments presented in Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) imply positive assortative matching (PAM) in each
industry. That is, among the workers and managers that sort to any industry, the better workers
are teamed with the better managers. This is true, because the productivity of a group of more
able workers relative to that of a group of less able workers is higher when the groups are combined
with a more able manager compared to when they are combined with a less able manager. As we
shall see, the equilibrium may or may not exhibit PAM for the economy as a whole.
In the appendix, we show that the solution to the rmsprot maximization problem and the
requirements for factor-market clearing together generate equilibrium allocation sets QLi and QHi
two sectors (which are provided in the appendix) and the requirement that the wage function is continuous at qL;
i.e., w1 (qL)
1=1 = w2 (q

L)
2=2 . Given w1 and w2, the salary anchors r1 and r2 are readily calculated.
19We do not consider the non-generic situations that arise when sL = 0 or sH = 0, in which case the heterogeneous
workers or managers would be indi¤erent as to their choice of sector.
20For some prices, there may be complete specialization in one sector or the other, in which case qL = qLmin
or qL = qLmax and q

H = qHmin or q

H = qHmax. In such cases, marginal changes in prices have no e¤ect on the
equilibrium, and so they are uninteresting for our purposes. We do not consider them any further.
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that are unions of closed intervals. (A threshold equilibrium is the special case in which each QFi
for F = H;L and i = 1; 2 is a single closed interval.)
Recall now that mi (qH) is the common ability level of the workers who would be teamed with
a manager of ability qH if that manager happened to be employed in sector i. The equilibrium
matching function for the economy, which we denoted by m (qH), consists of m1 (qH) for qH 2 QH1
and m2 (qH) for qH 2 QH2. The matching function generates a pair of closed graphs,
Mi = [fqH ; qLg j qL 2 mi (qH) for all qH 2 QHi] , i = 1; 2,
where Mi represents the production units that form in sector i in equilibrium. These graphs
comprise a union of connected sets Mni , i.e., Mi = [n2NiMni , such that mi (qH) is continuous and
strictly increasing in each set but may jump discontinuously between them. The fact that mi (qH)
is strictly increasing in each set is a reection of PAM.
We prove in the appendix that the equilibrium wage schedule is di¤erentiable everywhere and
use the notation for the matching function to rewrite (3) slightly as
"iL [qH ;m (qH)]
i
= "w [m (qH)] for all fqH ;m (qH)g 2Mn;inti , i = 1; 2; (6)
where Mn;inti is the interior of the set M
n
i . This way of expressing a rms optimal choice of
workers given the identity of the manager emphasizes the fact that the elasticity of productivity
with respect to worker ability depends upon the particular matches between workers and managers
that actually form in equilibrium. These matches in turn reect the sorting patterns of workers
and managers to industries.
Using (2) and (3), the zero-prot condition i (qH) = 0 for all qH 2 QHi can be written now as
r (qH) = 
i
1 i
i (1  i) p
1
1 i
i  i [qH ;m (qH)]
1
1 i w [m (qH)]
  i
1 i for all qH 2 QHi; i = 1; 2: (7)
This equation and (6) imply that
"iH [qH ;m (qH)]
1  i
= "r (qH) for all fqH ;m (qH)g 2Mn;inti ; i = 1; 2; (8)
where "r(qH)  qH [@r (qH) =@qH ] =r (qH). Notice the similarity with (6); prot maximization and
zero prots ensure that the ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to manager ability to
the elasticity of output with respect to manager quantity is equal, in equilibrium, to the elasticity of
the salary schedule. But, as with workers, the elasticity of productivity with respect to (manager)
ability depends on the matches that take place.
Equations (6) and (8) comprise a pair of di¤erential equations that relate the matching function,
the wage schedule and the salary schedule.21 A third such equation can be derived from the
21To see that these are di¤erential equations, note that "w [m (qh)]  m (qH)w0 [m (qH)] =w [m (qH)] and "r [qH ] 
qHr
0 (qH) =r (qH).
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requirements for factor-market clearing. To this end, consider any connected set of managers
[qHa; qH ] that sorts to industry i and the set of workers qL 2 [m (qHa) ;m (qH)] with whom these
managers are matched in equilibrium. A prot-maximizing rm in sector i that employs a manager
with ability qH and workers of ability qL hires ir (qH) = (1  i)w (qL) workers per manager. Since
the matching function is everywhere increasing, it follows that
H
Z qH
qHa
ir (q)
(1  i)w [m (q)]
H (q) dq = L
Z m(qH)
m(qHa)
L [m (q)] dq ;
where the left-hand side is the measure of workers hired collectively by all rms operating in sector
i that employ managers with ability between qHa and qH and the right-hand side is the measure
of workers available to be teamed with those managers. Since the left-hand side is di¤erentiable
in qH as long as qH is not a boundary point between managers that sort to di¤erent industries,
this equation implies that the matching function m (qH) also is di¤erentiable at such points. That
being the case, we can di¤erentiate the labor-market clearing condition with respect to qH to derive
a di¤erential equation for the matching function, namely
H
ir (qH)
(1  i)w [m (qH)]
H (qH) = LL [m (qH)]m
0 (qH) for all fqH ;m (qH)g 2Mn;inti ; i = 1; 2 .
(9)
This condition states that the workers demanded by a (small) set of managers with ability in a small
range around qH equals the density of workers in the economy that match with these managers.
At last, we are in a position to characterize an equilibrium allocation for the economy, given
prices. Such an allocation is fully described by a quadruple of sets, QiF for F = H;L and i = 1; 2,
a continuous wage schedule w (qL), a continuous salary schedule r (qH) and a piecewise continuous
matching function m (qH) that satisfy the di¤erential equations (6), (8) and (9) and that yield zero
prots per (7) for any active sector (and non-positive prots for any inactive sector).
The sorting patterns in this economy can in principle be quite complex. We wish to identify
conditions that ensure a simple pattern in particular, a threshold equilibrium which, as we have
seen, is the pattern that always emerges in an economy with Cobb-Douglas productivity functions.
To motivate our rst proposition, recall Figure 4. The gure shows the wage function and shadow
wage functions that result with Cobb-Douglas productivity. To the right of the cuto¤, qL, the rms
in industry 1 are willing to pay the (high-ability) workers more than rms in industry 2, because
the ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to worker ability to the elasticity of output
with respect to number of workers, "iL=i = i=i, is higher there. Similarly, to the left of q

L, it
is industry 2 that is willing to pay the (low-ability) workers more, because "iL=i is lower there.
The wage and shadow-wage functions reects these elasticity ratios at each point in the ability
distribution.
The wage and shadow-wage functions also reect these elasticity ratios in an economy with
strictly log supermodular productivity functions; see (3). A potential complication arises, however,
because the elasticity ratio for a worker depends upon the identity of the manager with whom
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the worker is matched, which in turn depends upon the incentives for sorting that confront the
managers. But suppose that the elasticity ratio in industry 1 is higher than in industry 2, even if in
the former case the workers of some ability level are teamed with the economys least able manager
and in the latter case they are teamed with the economys most able manager. Considering the
complementarity between worker and manager ability levels, the elasticity ratio in industry 1 for a
given worker then must be higher than that in industry 2 for the matches that actually take place,
no matter what they happen to be. These circumstances ensure the existence of a cuto¤ ability
level for workers qL such that rms in industry 1 are willing to pay workers with ability above q

L
more than industry 2, and the opposite is true for workers with ability less than qL for much the
same reasons as in the case of Cobb-Douglas productivity. In the appendix, we formally prove
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds and that
"iL (qHmin; qL)
i
>
"jL (qHmax; qL)
j
for all qL 2 SL; i 6= j; i 2 f1; 2g. Then, in any competitive equilibrium with employment of
workers in both sectors, the more able workers with qL > qL are employed in sector i and the less
able workers with qL < qL are employed in sector j, for some q

L 2 SL.
We have seen for the case of Cobb-Douglas productivity that an analogous condition that
compares elasticity ratios across sector guides the sorting of managers. Specically, whichever
industry has the higher ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to manager ability to
the elasticity of output with respect to manager quantity attracts the more able managers. Again,
with a general, strictly log supermodular productivity function the sorting incentives for the other
factor (workers, in this case) can complicate this comparison of elasticity ratios. But, in analogy
to Proposition 1, they will not do so if the forces attracting the more able managers to sort to a
sector would remain active even if the match there were consummated with the economys least
able workers and the match in the other sector were consummated with the economys most able
workers. We record
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds and that
"iH (qH ; qLmin)
1  i
>
"jH (qH ; qLmax)
1  j
for all qH 2 SH ; i 6= j; i 2 f1; 2g. Then, in any competitive equilibrium with employment of
managers in both sectors, the more able managers with qH > qH are employed in sector i and the
less able managers with qH < qH are employed in sector j, for some q

H 2 SH .
Clearly, if the inequality in Proposition 1 holds for some i and j and the inequality in Proposition
2 also holds for some i0 and j0, then the outcome is a threshold equilibrium. As with the case of
Cobb-Douglas productivity, such an equilibrium can take one of two forms. If i = i0 and j = j0,
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then the more able workers sort to the same sector as the more able managers, which characterizes
an HH=LL equilibrium. Alternatively, if i = j0 and j = i0, then the more able workers sort to the
opposite sector from the more able managers, which denes an HL=LH equilibrium.
It is possible to provide a weaker su¢ cient condition for the existence of a threshold equilibrium
of the HH=LL variety. If the most able managers sort to industry 1, this can only strengthen the
incentives for the most able workers to sort there too in light of the complementarities between
factor types. Similarly, if the most able workers sort to industry 1, this will strengthen the incentives
for the most able managers to do so as well. This reasoning motivates the following proposition
(proven in the appendix), that has less stringent conditions for the emergence of an HH=LL
threshold equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds. If
"iL (qH ; qL)
i
>
"jL (qH ; qL)
j
for all qH 2 SH ; qL 2 SL;
and
"iH (qH ; qL)
1  i
>
 jH (qH ; qL)
1  j
for all qH 2 SH ; qL 2 SL;
for i 6= j, i = 1 or i = 2, then in any competitive equilibrium with employment of managers and
workers in both sectors, the more able managers with qH > qH and the more able workers with
qL > q

L are employed in sector i; while the less able managers with qH < q

H and the less able
workers with qL < qL are employed in sector j, for some q

H 2 SH and some qL 2 SL.
The di¤erence in the antecedents in Propositions 1 and 2 on the one hand and in Proposition
3 on the other is that, in the former, we compare the elasticity ratio for each factor when it is
combined with the least able type of the other factor in one sector versus the most able type
in the other sector, whereas in the latter we compare the elasticity ratios for common partners
in the two sectors. The di¤erence arises, because an HH=LL equilibrium has PAM within and
across industries, whereas an HL=LH equilibrium has PAM only within industries. In an HL=LH
equilibrium, an able manager in sector i might be tempted to move to sector j despite a generally
greater responsiveness of productivity to ability in i, because the better workers have incentive to
sort to j, and with log supermodularity of  j (), the able manager stands to gain most from this
superior match. In contrast, in an HH=LL equilibrium, the able manager in sector i would nd
less able workers to match with were she to move to sector j, so the temptation to switch sectors
in order to upgrade partners is not present.
We have provided su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a threshold equilibrium in which the
allocation set for each factor and industry comprises a single, connected interval. These conditions
are not necessary, however, because the matches available to types that are quite di¤erent from the
marginal type might not overturn their strong comparative advantage in one sector or the other.
Nonetheless, not all parameter congurations give rise to equilibria with such a simple sorting
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Figure 5: Matching: The most and least able workers and the most able mangers sort into sector 1
pattern. An example of a more complex sorting pattern is illustrated in Figure 5.22 The gure
shows, for each worker type indicated along the horizontal axis, the sector in which that worker
is employed and the type of the manager with whom he is matched. In this example, the most
able and least able workers sort to sector 1 while an intermediate interval of worker types sort to
sector 2. The rms in sector 1 hire the economys most able managers whereas those in sector
2 hire those with ability below some threshold level. Notice that graphs M1 and M2 display the
general properties that we described above; they are unions of connected sets, with a matching
function m(qH) that is continuous and increasing within any such set. The gure reects a sorting
reversal for workers that arises because the elasticity ratio for labor is higher in sector 1 when
worker ability is low or high, but higher in sector 2 for a middle range of abilities. Of course, other
sorting patterns besides that depicted in Figure 5 also are possible.
5 Matching and Earnings within Groups
Before we turn to the e¤ects of changes in the trade environment on the distributions of wages
and salaries, it will prove useful to examine in some detail the implications of our equilibrium
conditions for the particular matches that form among a group of workers and a group of managers
that happen to be combined in equilibrium, and for the distributions of wages and salaries in the
two groups. To this end, consider a group of managers comprising all those with ability in the
interval QH = [qHa; qHb] and a group of workers comprising all those with ability in the interval
QL = [qLa; qLb]. Suppose these two groups happen to sort to some industry i in a competitive
equilibrium and that, collectively, the managers and workers in these two groups happen to be
matched together, exhaustively. We are interested in the properties of the solution to the system
of di¤erential equations comprising (6), (8) and (9) along with the zero-prot condition, (7), and
the two boundary conditions, qLa = mi (qHa) and qLb = mi (qHb). Throughout this section, we
22The functional forms and parameter values underlying this example are presented in Lim (2013).
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Figure 6: Shift in the matching function when qLb rises to qLb0 .
assume the existence of strong complementarities between worker and manager types; i.e., we take
productivity to be a strictly log supermodular function of the two ability levels, as embodied in
Assumption 10.
In the appendix, we prove that the solution has several notable properties. First, if the price pi
were to rise without any change in the composition of the two groups, then the matches between
particular members of the groups would remain unchanged and all wages and salaries would rise
by the same proportion as the output price. Second, if the number of managers in QH were to
increase by some proportion h relative to the number of workers in QL, without any change in
the relative densities of the di¤erent types, then the wages of all workers in QL would rise by the
proportion (1  i)h, while the salaries of all types in QH would fall by the proportion ih. Again,
there would be no change in the matching between manager and worker types.
Now suppose that one or both of the groups were to expand or contract on the extensive margin
without any change in the composition of types among the original members of the two groups. That
is, suppose that QH were to change to Q0H = [q
0
Ha; q
0
Hb] and QL were to change to Q
0
L = [q
0
La; q
0
Lb],
but with no change in LL (qL) or HH (qH). We nd (see Lemma 2 in the appendix) that the
matching functions that apply before and after the change can intersect at most once. Moreover
(see Lemma 6), if such an intersection exists, the situation with the steeper matching function at
the point of intersection also has lower wages and higher salaries for all ability levels of workers and
managers that are common to the two settings. This reects the associated changes in the sizes
of the production units; a steeper matching function implies that each manager is teamed with
a larger group of workers, which enhances the marginal product of the manager and reduces the
marginal product of the workers at any given ability level of either factor.
These points can be seen more clearly with the aid of Figure 6. The gure depicts the adjust-
ment in matching that would result from a change in a single boundary point, an increase in the
uppermost ability level of workers in the group from qLb to qLb0 . The curve ab represents the match-
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ing that takes place between the initial groups of workers and managers, whereas ab0 represents the
matching of the same set of managers with the broader set of workers. Naturally, the two curves
have a point in common, at a; PAM ensures that the managers with ability qHa match with the
workers of ability qLa in both circumstances. By Lemma 2 in the appendix, the two curves can have
at most one point in common, so there can be no further points of intersection. That is, the new
matching function ab0 must lie uniformly above ab to the right of point a. In the new equilibrium
with a broader (and better) group of workers, every manager in QH with ability greater than qHa
achieves a better match than before. Meanwhile, every worker with ability greater than qLa but
less than or equal to qLb pairs with a less able manager than before. Finally, Lemma 6 implies that
salaries rise for all managers in QH , while wages fall for all workers in QL.
The adjustment in matching that is illustrated in Figure 6 also has implications for within-
group inequality. Consider the wage distribution among workers in QL. The di¤erential equation
(6) implies that
lnwi (qLc)  lnwi (qLc0) =
Z qLc0
qLc
 iL [i (x) ; x]
i i [i (x) ; x]
dx; for all qLc;qLc0 2 QL ; (10)
where i () is the inverse of mi (). If follows that, if all workers with ability levels between qLc
and qLc0 , qLc > qLc0 , are teamed with less able managers than before, the wage of the more able
worker of type qLc declines relative to that of the less able worker of type qLc0 . The downgrading
of managers is detrimental to both of these workers, but the strong complementarity between
factor types means that it is especially so to the more able of the pair. Specically, strict log
supermodularity of  i (qH ; qL) implies that  iL (qH ; qL) = i (qH ; qL) is a strictly increasing function
of qH . It follows that a rematching of a group of workers with less able managers, as depicted in
Figure 6, generates a narrowing of wage inequality within the group QL.23 By a similar argument
(and using the di¤erential equation (8) for salaries), the rematching depicted in Figure 6 generates
a spread in the salary distribution for managers in QH inasmuch as these managers all see their
matches improve.
Similar reasoning can be used to describe the shift in the matching function and the wage and
salary responses for changes in the other boundary points. For example, if the lower boundary of
the interval of managers rises from qHa to qHa0 , the matching function shifts downward (thereby
connecting a point to the right of a in Figure 6 with point b), and thus the manager types that
remain in the sector nd that their matches deteriorate while all workers in QL match with better
managers than before. Such a rematching narrows the salary distribution, while exacerbating wage
inequality.
In short, whenever the matches improve for a group of workers employed in some sector, they
deteriorate for the managers there, and vice versa. As a result, within-occupation-and-industry
inequality among workers and managers tend to shift in opposite directions. This implication of
23Costinot and Vogel (2010) and Sampson (2014) nd similar results for wage inequality when workers downgrade
their matches with rms that di¤er in technological sophistication.
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our model gives it the potential to rationalize Observation 3 in Section 2, namely that changes in
inequality among Brazilian workers and managers are negatively correlated across industries.
6 The E¤ects of Trade on Earnings Inequality
We come nally to the main concern of our analysis: How does trade a¤ect the distribution of income
within and between occupations and industries? We study the e¤ects of trade by examining the
comparative statics with respect to output prices. In a world of competitive industries, an opening
of trade induces an increase in the relative price of a countrys export good. An expansion of trade
opportunities that improves a countrys terms of trade does likewise. So too does a reduction in a
countrys import tari¤ or other trade barriers, except under the conditions for the Metzler paradox.
So, we can study the e¤ects of trade without introducing the details of other countries by simply
investigating how output prices feed through to factor markets.24
To preview what lies ahead, we will identify and describe three forces that are at work in this
setting. Two are familiar and one is new. First, whenever 1 6= 2, our model features factor
intensity di¤erences across industries. As is well known from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
this consideration introduces an e¤ect of trade on between-occupation distribution; an increase in
the relative price of a good tends to increase demand for all types of the factor used intensively
in producing that good, while reducing the demand for all types of the other factor. Second,
our model incorporates factor heterogeneity that, whenever  1 () 6=  2 (), generates comparative
advantage for certain types of each factor in one industry or the other. This feature introduces an
e¤ect of trade on between-industry distribution; an increase in the relative price of a good tends
to increase the rewards for all types of both occupations that enjoy a comparative advantage in
producing that good, and to reduce the returns to types that hold a comparative disadvantage
in doing so. This e¤ect is familiar from the Ricardo-Viner model with sector specicity. Finally,
whenever  i (qH ; qL) exhibits strict log supermodularity, our model determines the matches that
form between managers and workers in each industry. This feature introduces an e¤ect of trade on
within-group (occupation-and-industry) distribution.
6.1 Wages and Salaries with Cobb-Douglas Productivity
As before, it is instructive to begin with the knife-edge case in which productivity in each sector
is log supermodular, but not strictly so. We revisit an economy with Cobb-Douglas productivity;
i.e.,  i (qH ; qL) = q
i
H q
i
L for i = 1; 2; i; i > 0.
Recall from Section 4.1 that, with Cobb-Douglas productivity in each sector, the sorting of fac-
tors to sectors is guided by a cross-industry comparison of the ratio of the elasticity of productivity
with respect to a factors ability to the elasticity of output with respect to factor quantity. That
24 In our working paper, Grossman et al. (2013), we link the pattern of trade to cross-country di¤erences in
quantities and distributions of the two factors. Thus, we treat the the price change that results from an opening of
trade as an endogenous reection of factor-endowment di¤erences. Here, we take the price changes as exogenous in
order to focus attention on the distributional implications of changes in the trade environment.
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is, when i=i > j=j , higher ability confers a comparative advantage among workers for employ-
ment in industry i, while when i0= (1  i0) > j0=
 
1  j0

, higher ability confers a comparative
advantage among managers for employment in industry i0. The matches that form between workers
and managers that sort to an industry are indeterminate.
It is clear from (4) and (5) that trade has no e¤ect on within-group inequality in these cir-
cumstances. The relative wage of any two workers with ability levels qLa and qLb that are both
employed in the same sector i before and after any change in the trading environment is fully deter-
mined by their relative ability levels; i.e., w (qLa) =w (qLb) = (qLa=qLb)
i=i . Similarly, the relative
salary of any two managers with ability levels qHa and qHb that are employed in sector i prior
and subsequent to a change in the trading environment is r (qHa) =r (qHb) = (qHa=qHb)
i=(1 i).
Evidently, the complementarity between factor types must be strong enough to induce endogenous
meaningful rematching, or else relative wages within any occupation-and-industry group will be
xed by technological considerations and una¤ected by trade.
The e¤ects of trade on between-occupation and between-industry inequality can be seen from
the comparative-static responses of the wage anchors, w1 and w2, and the salary anchors, r1 and
r2. These comparative statics can be computed from six equations that also determine qL and q

H :
two equations that ensure that the demand for workers that sort to each sector equals the supply of
workers that does so; two equations that ensure that the wage and salary schedules are continuous
at qL and q

H , respectively; and two equations that ensure that prots are zero in each industry.
The equations and calculations are provided in the appendix.
The Ricardo-Viner and Stolper-Samuelson forces can be seen most clearly in certain limiting
cases. Suppose, for example, that 1  2; i.e., there are only small cross-industry di¤erences in
the diminishing returns to the number of workers per manager and thus small di¤erences in the
intensity of factor use. In this case, if i > j , then an increase in the price ratio pi=pj generates
an increase in wi relative to wj and if i0 > j0 , an increase in pi0=pj0 generates an increase in ri0
relative to rj0 . Consider for example the e¤ect of the price change on workers. With i  j , the
fact that i > j implies that high-ability workers have a comparative advantage in sector i relative
to sector j, and vice versa for low-ability workers. Then, if the relative price of good i increases,
this changes the between-industry distribution, favoring those (high-ability workers) employed in
sector i relative to those (low-ability workers) employed in sector j. An analogous explanation
applies to the changes in the between-industry distribution of managerial salaries.
Now suppose that i > j , whereas 1=1  2=2 and 1= (1  1)  2= (1  2). With
this constellation of parameters, the forces that give certain types of each factor a comparative
advantage in one sector or the other are muted. No matter what sorting pattern emerges, the
predominant e¤ect of trade will be on the between-occupation distribution. In particular, since
sector i makes relatively intensive use of workers and sector j makes relatively intensive use of
managers, an increase in pi=pj increases both wi and wj relative to both ri and rj . All workers
gain relative to all managers. Indeed, we can go further to say as an extension of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem that when i > j , an increase in the relative price of good i raises the real
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income of every type of worker and reduces the real income of every type of manager.
Another instructive case has i  j and 1  2, but i > j . Then, there is little di¤erence in
factor intensity and little di¤erence in the relative productivity of managers of di¤erent abilities in
the two sectors. What remains is a strong tendency for the high-ability workers to sort to industry i
and the low-ability workers to sort to industry j, in accordance with their comparative advantages.
This is a case where the workers have industry specicity, but the managers do not (or only slightly
so). As in the classic Ricardo-Viner model (e.g., Jones, 1971), we nd that when pi=pj rises, the
real incomes of all (high-ability) workers who start in industry i increase while the real incomes of
all (low-ability) workers who end up in industry j fall. In other words, trade benets the worker
types that have specicity in the export sector but harms the worker types that have specicity in
the import-competing sector.25 In contrast, trade has a qualitatively similar impact on all manager
types; their real salaries rise in terms of good i but fall in terms of good j.
In less extreme cases, the Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner forces coexist. We nd that
the worker types with comparative advantage in industry i always gain relative to those with
comparative advantage in industry j when the relative price of good i rises. Similarly, the manager
types that sort to industry i gain relative to those that sort to industry j. Whether a group of
workers or a group of managers benets absolutely, and not just relatively, from a change in the trade
environment depends on the direction and strength of the Stolper-Samuelson forces; for example,
all workers may gain from an increase in pi=pj if industry i is much more labor intensive than
industry j, whereas only some may gain if the di¤erence in factor intensity is smaller, and all may
lose if the factor-intensity ranking runs in the opposite direction. These ndings are reminiscent of
those described by Mussa (1982) for an economy with imperfect factor mobilityand by Grossman
(1983) for an economy with partially mobile capital.
The results described in this section are interesting and will help us to understand those that
follow. But they are not consistent with the evidence presented in Section 2, in particular because
they imply that trade has no e¤ect on within occupation-and-industry earnings inequality. We have
noted, for example, that within-group variation accounted for a majority of the overall change in
Brazilian income inequality that occurred during the period that spanned the trade liberalization
of 1991. To allow for changes in within-group inequality, we must re-introduce Assumption 10.
6.2 Wages and Salaries with Strictly Log Supermodular Productivity
We henceforth assume that productivity in each sector is a strictly log supermodular function of
the ability of the manager and the abilities of the workers; i.e., we adopt Assumption 10. We shall
limit our attention to threshold equilibria; i.e., those that can be characterized by a pair of cuto¤
points, qL and q

H ; such that all workers with ability above the cuto¤ sort to one industry and all
those with ability below the cuto¤ sort to the other, and similarly for managers.
25 If we instead assume that i > j and that i=i > j=j , but that i= (1  i)  j=
 
1  j

, then the Stolper-
Samuelson forces reinforce the positive e¤ects of an increase in pi=pj on the high-ability workers while o¤setting the
negative e¤ects of this price change on the low-ability workers. In such circumstances, the real incomes of the most
able workers must rise, whereas those of the least able workers can rise or fall.
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In the appendix we prove a general result that applies to all threshold equilibria. Consider the
e¤ects of a change in the relative price pi=pj on output levels and factor allocation. Not surprisingly,
an increase in pi=pj induces a rise in the aggregate output of good i and a decline in the aggregate
output of good j. In principle, this could be accomplished by a reallocation of only one factor from
industry j to industry i; for example, workers might move from j to i, while managers might move
in the opposite direction. In fact, however, this does not happen in any threshold equilibrium.
When pi=pj rises, the numbers of workers and managers employed in sector i both expand, while
the numbers employed in sector j contract. In terms of the cuto¤s values that describe a threshold
equilibrium, this reallocation implies an adjustment of both extensive margins. If, for example,
high-ability workers sort to industry i in equilibrium, then an increase in pi=pj causes qL to fall.
But if low-ability workers sort to industry i, qL rises. Similarly for managers, the direction of
movement of qH varies according to the initial sorting pattern so that, in any case, the number of
managers in industry i grows.
6.2.1 Inequality in an HL=LH Equilibrium
As we recall, a threshold equilibrium can be one of two types; either the more able types of both
factors sort to the same industry (an HH=LL equilibrium) or the more able types of one factor sort
to the same industry as the less able types of the other (an HL=LH equilibrium). We will begin
with the latter, even though it is somewhat at odds with the evidence we discussed in Section 2. In
both Brazil and Sweden, as we noted, there is a strong positive correlation across industries in the
mean wage of workers and the mean salary of managers. This observation is most consistent with
an equilibrium pattern in which the more able types of both factors sort similarly. Notwithstanding,
there are some pairwise industry comparisons in the data for both countries in which the ranking
of average incomes across sectors is di¤erent for the two factors. The analysis in this section might
therefore be relevant for some industries and some countries. Moreover, the results for the HL=LH
equilibrium are easier to explain, and so it helps to begin here in order to build intuition.
In Figure 7, the solid curves cd and ab depict the qualitative features of the two segments of the
inverse matching function in an HL=LH equilibrium. Each curve is upward sloping, representing
the positive assortative matching that occurs in each sector. In the gure, industry i attracts
the economys best managers, i.e., those with ability levels above qH . But this industry employes
the least able workers, those with ability levels below qL. Evidently, PAM does not hold for the
economy as a whole.
Now suppose that pi=pj rises, as when the country opens to trade and begins to export good i.
As we have noted, the allocations of workers and of managers to industry i expand on the extensive
margins. In other words, qL rises to a point like ~q

L, while q

H falls to a point like ~q

H . Accordingly,
the new boundary points for industry j move to a0 and b0, whereas those for industry i become c0
and d0.
The ex post inverse matching function for industry j connects a0 with b0. But, by Lemma 2
in the appendix, it cannot cross ab more than once. Evidently, the new curve for industry i must
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Figure 7: E¤ects of a rise in pi=pj on matching: HL=LH equilibrium
lie everywhere below the initial curve, as drawn. By similar reasoning, the new inverse matching
function for industry i also must lie everywhere below the old curve; it must connect c0 and d0
and it cannot cross cd twice. We conclude that every worker initially employed in industry i and
every worker who remains employed in industry j matches with a less able manager than before.
Only the workers that switch sectors team with better managers than they did prior to the price
hike. Correspondingly, all of the managers in the economy who initially were employed in industry
i or who remain employed in industry j are matched with more able workers than before. Those
who switch sectors namely, those who were initially matched with the very best workers in the
economy experience a deterioration in match.
The rematching described in the previous paragraph has strong implications for within occupation-
and-industry income inequality. Consider the relative wage of any two workers with abilities qLa
and qLb, qLa > qLb; who were employed in sector i prior to the increase in the relative price and
who, of course, remain so afterward. The downward shift in the inverse matching function, i (qL)
implies, by (10), that the relative wage w (qLa) =w (qLb) declines. Both workers and all others
originally employed in industry i experience a downgrading of their manager. The partial e¤ect
of this is detrimental to the productivity of both, but especially so for the more able of the two.
As we shall see, this does not necessarily mean that the workers lose in real terms, as there are
between-occupation and between-industry e¤ects yet to be considered. But it does mean that the
wage schedule among workers in industry i tilts in favor of those at the bottom end of the indus-
trys pay scale. Within occupation-and-industry wage inequality declines among workers initially
employed in the export sector.
The same is true among workers that remain employed in sector j subsequent to the contraction
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Figure 8: E¤ects of a 5% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HL=LH equilibrium without
Stolper-Samuelson forces
of that industry. Among any two such workers, the downward shift in j (qL) implies a relative
wage gain for the less able of the two. This tilting of the wage schedule spells a decline in within
occupation-and-industry inequality for this group of workers as well. Moreover, wage inequality
also declines for the set of workers that switches industries.26 It follows that a plot of proportional
wage changes against qL is downward sloping along its entire length; see the top panel of Figure
8 (discussed further below) for an example. This implies, of course, that wage inequality declines
among workers as a whole. We emphasize too that every worker in industry i gains relative to
any counterpart in industry j, which is an indication of between-industry wage redistribution.
This redistribution is analogous to what we described in Section 6.1 for the case of Cobb-Douglas
productivity. It reects the fact that a workers type confers comparative advantage in one industry
or the other and so imparts a degree of sector specicity.
The results for managerial salaries are analogous. The match improvements for managers that
initially were employed in sector i and for those that continue to be employed in sector j imply a
widening of the within occupation-and-industry salary distribution for both of these groups. Income
inequality also rises among the set of managers that reallocates from industry j to industry i, and
26Consider two workers, with abilities qLc and qLd that both switch industries, with qLc > qLd. By (6), the
elasticity of the wage schedule "w(qL) is determined, ex post, by the elasticity ratio for the expanding industry i;
whereas beforehand it was determined by the elasticity ratio for the contracting industry j. The condition for the
sorting of high-abiilty workers to sector i implies that the former elasticity ratio is higher. Accordingly, the wage
elasticity falls among this group of workers.
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among the occupation as a whole. We summarize our ndings about the e¤ects of relative price
movements on wage and salary inequality in an HL=LH equilibrium with the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds and that there exists a threshold equilibrium with
an HL=LH sorting pattern for all pi 2 [pi0; pi1]. Then an increase in pi from pi0 to pi1 raises within
occupation-and-industry income inequality and overall income inequality for the factor whose high-
ability types sort to industry i and reduces within occupation-and-industry income inequality and
overall income inequality for the factor whose high-ability types sort to industry j.
Notice that Proposition 4 makes no reference to the factor intensities in the two sectors.
While Proposition 4 speaks to inequality within occupations, it says nothing about redistribution
between occupations, nor about the e¤ects of trade on the (absolute) real income levels of any
groups. For this we turn to numerical simulations and to the intuition that we developed for the
case of Cobb-Douglas productivity. Figure 8 presents the outcome of a simulation with 1 = 2,
although qualitatively similar results apply whenever the di¤erence between the relative factor
intensities of the two sectors is reasonably small.27 The gure shows the percentage change in
wages (in the top panel) and salaries (in the bottom panel) across the full range of ability levels
in response to a 5% increase in the price of good 2. This is a case where Stolper-Samuelson forces
are absent, and the ndings are consistent with the intuition of the Ricardo-Viner model. First,
the highest-ability manager and the lowest-ability worker both see their incomes rise by more than
5%, which indicates real income gains for both. These individuals are the ones with the strongest
comparative advantage in industry 2, the expanding industry. In general, incomes of those (workers
or managers) who are initially employed in industry 2 rise substantially relative to those of their
occupational counterparts that remain employed in industry 1. In this example, all the workers who
remain in industry 1 su¤er nominal wage losses and thus declines in real incomes. The managers in
industry 1, on the other hand, see small salary gains, and so their real incomes might rise if their
expenditures are su¢ ciently biased toward the good they produce. In any case, the gure highlights
the between-industry redistribution that results from the specicity of the di¤erent factor types.
The gure also shows, as previously noted, a ubiquitous narrowing of the wage distribution and
spreading of the salary distribution that reects the rematching in each industry.
Figure 9 depicts the wage and salary responses to a 10% increase in the price of good 2 for an
economy with a substantial di¤erence in factor intensities; in particular, industry 2 is signicantly
more worker-intensive than industry 1.28 The outcomes reect the strong between-occupation
distributional forces at work in this case. All of the workers, regardless of ability, see a rise in
27The details of the simulation method and the parameter values and results for many examples are provided
in Kim (2013). All examples use truncated Pareto distributions for the distributions of worker and manager abili-
ties and a CES specication for  i (qH ; qL), with an elasticity of substitution less than one that ensures strict log
supermodularity.
28The astute reader may have noticed that we illustrate the e¤ects of a 10% price increase here, whereas Figure
8 depicted the e¤ects of a smaller, 5% change. Since our model is not log linear, price hikes of di¤erent percentage
amounts have quantitatively di¤erent e¤ects on factor prices. We have chosen the numerical examples in order to
enhance visual clarity.
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Figure 9: E¤ects of a 10% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HL=LH equilibrium with
strong Stolper-Samuelson forces
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Figure 10: E¤ects of a rise in pi=pj on matching: HH=LL equilibrium
real wage, while all of the managers su¤er real income losses. Of course, the workers employed in
industry 2 fare better than their counterparts in industry 1, since their types confer a comparative
advantage in producing good 2. Similarly, the very able managers employed in industry 2 experience
smaller real income losses than their less able counterparts. Again, the gure shows the ubiquitous
increase in salary inequality and ubiquitous fall in wage inequality that are prescribed by Proposition
4.
A host of other congurations can emerge, but all can be understood similarly with reference
to the relevant factor intensities that generate between-occupation redistribution and the sector-
specicities that generate between-industry redistribution; see Lim (2013) for further examples.
Rather than dwell on these intermediate cases, we turn now to the wage and salary e¤ects of trade
in an HH=LL equilibrium.
6.2.2 Inequality in an HH=LL Equilibrium
The data for Brazil and Sweden reveal a strong positive correlation between the average wage paid
to workers and the average salary paid to managers and professionals in the same industry. These
data suggest that positive assortative matching takes place not only within industries, but across
industries as well. In terms of the threshold equilibria that can arise in our model, only the HH=LL
equilibrium exhibits such economy-wide PAM.
In Figure 10, the thick curve abc represents the qualitative features of the inverse matching
function in an initial HH=LL equilibrium. The curve is upward sloping along its entire length,
reecting PAM within and across sectors. Now suppose that pi=pj rises, inducing a reallocation of
resources to industry i. From our earlier discussion, we know that both qL and q

H must increase,
which means that point b shifts up and to the right. The gure depicts three conceivable locations
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for the new threshold, at b1, b2 and b3. Lim (2013) provides numerical examples of each such
possibility.
If the new threshold falls at a point such as b1, the outcome implies improved matching for
all workers who were initially in sector i and for all those who remain in sector j, and indeed for
those who switch sectors as well. Meanwhile, all managers nd themselves teamed with less able
workers than before. If, instead, the new threshold falls at a point such as b2, the managers see
their matches improve, while workers see theirs deteriorate. Finally, if the new threshold point is
b3, workers who were initially in sector i are matched with better managers than before, whereas
the opposite is true for those workers who remain in sector j. Managers who were initially in sector
i rematch with less able workers, while managers who remain in sector j see an upgrade in their
charges.29
To understand when each outcome may occur and its implications for inequality, we suppose
rst that relative factor intensities are the same in the two industries; i.e., 1 = 2. In such
circumstances, the two sectoral matching functions mi (qH) and mj (qH) of an HH=LL equilibrium
must shift in the same direction in response to any small changes in the relative price pi=pj .30
Although we have not been able to prove that the same must occur for large price changes, neither
could we nd any numerical counterexamples. It seems that with 1 = 2, the threshold must
shift to a point like b1 or b2, with matches either improving for all workers and deteriorating for all
managers, or vice versa.31
Figure 11 depicts the wage and salary e¤ects of a 20% increase in the price of the good pro-
duced by the economys least able workers and managers when factor intensities are the same
in both industries and when workersmatches improve and managersmatches deteriorate every-
where.32 Notice rst that the improved matching for workers implies a ubiquitous increase in within
occupation-and-industry wage inequality, while wages rise in the low-paying industry 2 relative to
those in the high-paying industry 1. An economy-wide measure of wage inequality will reect a
balancing of these o¤setting forces. Meanwhile, managerial salaries become more equal both within
industries, across industries, and for the economy as a whole. Clearly, factor specicity explains the
cross-industry redistribution, while rematching in the presence of factor complementarities explains
the within-industry e¤ects.
We can also deduce the implications for real incomes in this case. Notice that the inverse
29 It is also possible for the matches to improve for workers remaining in sector j, while deteriorating for those who
were initially in sector i; see gure 18 in Lim (2013) for an example. In such a case, the matching function in sector
i is steeper than that in sector j, and the former shifts down while the latter shifts up.
30This claim is proved in the appendix.
31Lim (2013) nds a systematic pattern in these outcomes. As depicted in Figure 10, let i be the industry that
attracts the less able workers and managers and suppose that the relative price of this good rises. Further, suppose
that the productivity function in sector i is  i (qH ; qL) =
 
iq
i
H + iq
i
L
1=i for i < 0. Then Lim nds an upward
shift in the inverse matching functions in both sectors whenever (i) i=i = j=j = 1 and i = j < 1=2; (ii)
i=i = j=j > 1 and i = j = 1=2; and (iii) i=i < j=j = 1 and i = j = 1=2. If, instead, the inequalities
in (i) or (ii) are reversed, or if j=j < i=i = 1 and i = j = 1=2, then the inverse matching function shifts down
in both sectors.
32Other cases with 1 = 2 can be understood similarly in terms of whether prices increase for the sector that
employs the more able types or the less able types and whether matches for workers improve or deteriorate.
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Figure 11: E¤ects of a 20% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HH=LL equilibrium without
Stolper-Samuelson forces
matching function becomes steeper at point a in Figure 10 when the threshold shifts from b to b1.
By Lemmas 1 and 6 in the appendix, this implies that the real income of the economys least able
worker must rise. A fortiori, real wages rise for all workers who were initially employed in sector 2.
Meanwhile, the inverse matching function becomes atter at point c, which implies a fall in the real
income for the economys most able worker and, a fortiori, for all workers who remain employed in
industry 1 after the price change. In these circumstances, the salaries of the least able managers
must fall in terms of good 2, while the salaries of the most able managers must rise in terms of
good 1.33 It follows that real incomes may increase (or decrease) for some (or all) of the managers,
depending on the composition of their consumption baskets.
We recap the ndings that apply when factor intensities are the same in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds, that i = j, and that that there exists a thresh-
old equilibrium with an HH=LL sorting pattern. Then a small increase in the relative price pi=pj
improves matches for all types of one factor and worsens matches for all types of the other. If the
relative price of the good produced by the less able types rises and matches improve for all types of
factor F; F 2 fH;Lg, and deteriorate for all types of factor K, K 6= F , then within occupation-and-
industry income inequality increases for factor F and declines for factor K in both sectors, while
33These statements follow from the fact that the inverse matching function becomes steeper at a but atter at c.
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Figure 12: E¤ects of a 20% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HH=LL equilibrium with
opposite shifts in sectoral matching functions and moderate Stolper-Samuelson forces
between-industry inequality declines for both factors. Real incomes rise for all types of factor F
that are initially employed in the expanding sector and decline for all types of factor F that remain
employed in the contracting sector.
Notice that the e¤ects on within occupation-and-industry inequality, on between-industry in-
equality, and on real incomes described in Proposition 5 do not rely on the assumption that factor
intensities are the same in the two industries. They arise anytime the matching functions shift
in the same direction in both sectors. However, such shifts in the sectoral matching functions are
more likely to occur when the factor-intensity di¤erence is small.
We turn next to the case in which the di¤erence between 1 and 2 is larger and gives rise
to opposing shifts in the two sectoral matching functions. Figure 10 illustrates such an outcome,
when the threshold shifts to a point like b3. Alternatively, the inverse matching function for sector i
might be steeper than that for sector j, and then the former might shift down while the latter shifts
up. In the appendix, we prove that the inverse matching function for sector i is atter than that
for sector j (as shown in the gure) if and only if i > j ; i.e., sector i is relatively labor intensive
compared to sector j. In any case, if matching improves for workers in one sector and deteriorates
for those in the other, it always improves for those in the labor-intensive industry. When the
labor-intensive sector is also the one that attracts the economys least able workers, an increase in
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the relative price of the labor-intensive good generates a spreading of the wage distribution in that
sector, a contraction of the wage distribution in the other, and a narrowing of between-industry
wage inequality thanks to the relative gains for those types with a comparative advantage in sector
i. Meanwhile, salary inequality narrows among managers in the expanding sector, widens among
those who remain in the contracting sector, and diminishes between industries. Figure 12 provides
another example from Lim (2013).
In the example depicted in the Figure 12, all workers initially employed in sector 2 enjoy gains
in real incomes. This is always true when the labor-intensive sector employs the least able workers
and the relative price of the labor-intensive good rises, because Lemmas 1 and 6 in the appendix
ensure that the real wage in terms of good 2 increases for the worker with ability qLmin and other
workers initially employed in the industry fare even better. The gure shows that the wages of
workers who remain in sector 1 increase less than in proportion to the rise in the price of good
2, but a stronger Stolper-Samuelson force could generate real income gains for all workers in the
economy. Meanwhile, all managers who remain in sector 1 see a decline in their real salaries
inasmuch as the Stolper-Samuelson force and the Ricardo-Viner force push in the same direction
for these individuals. The decline in real income for the managers of type qHmax is ensured by
Lemma 6, and the other managers who remain in the industry lose ground relative to these most
able types.
Our nal proposition summarizes our ndings for an HH=LL equilibrium in which the sectoral
matching functions shift in opposite directions in the two industries. This requires of course that
factor intensities di¤er signicantly across the two sectors.
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 10 holds and that there exists a threshold equilibrium with
an HH=LL sorting pattern. If an increase in the relative price pi=pj improves matches for factor
F in one sector but not the other, then the matches must improve in the sector that uses factor
F intensively. This generates an increase in within occupation-and-industry inequality for types
of factor F employed in the F -intensive sector and a reduction in within occupation-and-industry
inequality for types employed in the other sector. Between industry inequality rises for both factors
if and only if sector i attracts the economys more productive types. If industry i uses factor F
relatively intensively, then real incomes must rise for all types of factor F initially employed in
industry i and must fall for all types of factor K, K 6= F , that remain employed in industry j.
Notice that the outcomes described in Proposition 6 and illustrated in Figure 12 are very much
consistent with Observation 4 in Section 2; the correlation across industries between the change in
relative price and the change in within-occupation-and-industry inequality are opposite in sign for
the two factors.34
The approach taken in this section can provide guidance to the empirical researcher. Our results
point to the importance of distinguishing employees by occupation and industry when studying the
34The equilibria represented by points b1 and b2 in Figure 10 might also be consistent with Observation 4, but
those equilibria do not necessarily imply opposite correlations for the two factors without the imposition of further
parameter restrictions.
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e¤ects of trade on income inequality. As we know from the classic papers in neoclassical trade
theory, the distributional e¤ects of changes in the trade environment can di¤er for managers versus
workers and for employees in an export industry versus those in an import-competing industry. To
this we add the observation that the e¤ects of trade on within occupation-and-industry inequality
also can vary by occupation and sector. The model yields strong predictions about these e¤ects
once we know the equilibrium sorting patterns of the factors, the relative factor intensities in the
import competing versus export industries, and the size of the factor-intensity di¤erences across
industries. The HH=LL equilibrium in particular yields a rich menu of possible outcomes, while
o¤ering enough restrictions to be empirically meaningful. It should be possible to condition future
empirical research on trade and inequality on the attributes that govern factor sorting and the
cross-industry pattern of factor-intensity di¤erences.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a framework that can be used to study the e¤ects of trade on income inequality.
Our model features two industries, two factors of production, and perfect competition, in keeping
with a familiar setting from neoclassical trade theory. Indeed, we have chosen this economic envi-
ronment so that we might draw on a deep understanding of the distributional e¤ects of trade in
the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models. To the standard, Heckscher-Ohlin set-up, we have
added heterogeneous types of each of the two factors of production. With this simple extension,
our model is capable of generating rich predictions about the e¤ects of trade on within occupation-
and-industry income inequality. Such e¤ects seem to be important in the data, yet are beyond the
reach of much of the existing literature.
Redistribution within occupations and industries occurs in response to relative price changes
whenever there exist su¢ ciently strong complementarities between the types of the various factors
in determining the productivity of a production unit. We have assumed that productivity in each
unit is a log supermodular function of the ability of the manager and the ability levels of the
workers, with output per manager being the product of productivity and a concave function of
the number of workers. We have allowed for cross-sectoral di¤erences in factor intensity as well as
di¤erences in the complementarities between worker and manager types.
In this setting, the sorting of factor types to industries is guided by a cross-sectoral comparison
of the ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to an employees ability relative to the
elasticity of output with respect to factor quantity. However, the elasticities of productivity with
respect to worker ability may depend on the type of the manager with whom the worker cooperates,
and similarly for managers. For this reason, the forces that determine sorting for workers and
managers can be interdependent. We have described equilibria in which the more able workers
and more able managers sort to the same industry, as well as equilibria in which the more able
workers sort to the same industry as the less able managers. More complex sorting patterns also
are possible.
37
The e¤ects of trade on income distribution are mediated by relative product prices. Accordingly,
we have studied how changes in commodity prices a¤ect the equilibrium wage and salary schedules.
We have focused on threshold equilibria in which all the more able workers sort to one industry
while the less able workers sort to the other, and similarly for managers. The wage and salary
correlations for Brazil and Sweden demand that special attention be paid to equilibria with positive
assortative matching across industries.
Our analysis blends Stolper-Samuelson forces, Ricardo-Viner forces, and new forces that reect
factor complementarities. In particular, a rise in the price of the labor-intensive product tends to
increase all wages relative to all salaries. A rise in the price of a countrys export good tends to
favor those types of workers and managers that have a comparative advantage in the export sector,
as reected in the sorting pattern. And a change in any price tends to generate rematching of
workers and managers, according to the change in the composition of types in each industry that
results from the intersectoral resource movements. When the matches for a factor improve in an
industry, within occupation-and-industry inequality rises, as the more able (and better paid) types
benet relatively more from the upgrading of their partners than their less able counterparts.
Our approach to introducing factor heterogeneity could be applied to other trade models. For
example, it would be straightforward to incorporate matching of heterogeneous types of multiple
factors in a setting à la Sampson (2014) with monopolistic competition and xed costs of exporting.
Or one could do so in a model of horizontal foreign direct investment, to study the formation of
international production teams, as in Antràs et al. (2006). We think it would be particularly
interesting to introduce search frictions to capture possible impediments to the perfect matching
of worker and manager types. In such a setting, one could ask how globalization impacts the
formation of production teams and thereby the productivity of rms.
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Appendix for Matching, Sorting , and the Distributional E¤ects
of International Trade
by
Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman, and Phillip Kircher
This appendix provides proofs of results and gures stated in the main text.
Figure for Section 2
Figure 13 depicts the relationship between the average salary of managers and the average wage of
workers of Swedish employees in manufacturing industries in 2004, in analogy to Figure 1 in the main text
for Brazil. Each point represents one industry; the log of the average salary of managers is measured on
the vertical axis while the log of the average wage of workers is measured on the horizontal axis. It is again
apparent that industries with higher salaries of managers have also higher wages.
Figure 13: Variation across manufacturing industries of log mean salary of managers and log mean
wage of workers in Sweden: 2004. Source: private communication, Anders Akerman.
Proofs for Section 4.1
Consider Cobb-Douglas productivity according to Assumption 1. Labor demand (2) then takes the form
` (qL; qH)=
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H q
i
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w (qL)
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1 i
. (11)
Substituting (11) into the expression for net prots i (`; qL; qH)  r(qH) yields
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where r(qH) is the salary of a manager with ability qH and i 
i
1 i
i (1  i). Every rm chooses the
ability of its workers and the ability of its manager so as to maximize prots, yet free entry dictates that
these prots must be equal to zero in equilibrium. LetMi be the set of all matches that maximize prots in
sector i. For each pairing (qL; qH) in Mi,
r (qH)= 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i , i = 1; 2; (13)
by dint of the zero-prot condition. Recall from (4) the equilibrium wage schedule
w (qL)= wiq
i=i
L for qL2 QintLi ; (14)
where the superscript intdenotes the interior of the set. Substitutions into the previous equation
establishes the salary schedule for managers
r (qH)= riq
i=(1 i)
H for qH2 QintHi , (15)
where ri is a salary anchoranalogous to wi.
As discussed in the main text, these wages and salaries leave a rm indi¤erent among workers and
managers within a sector, and so matching between managers and workers within a sector is indeterminate.
Sorting to sectors is not indeterminate, though, but higher worker types sort into sector 1 if sL = 1=1  
2=2 > 0 and higher rm types sort into sector 1 if sH = 1= (1  1)  2= (1  2) > 0: Let qL and
qH denote the worker and rm type that is indi¤erent between sectors.
To describe the equilibrium, we invoke factor-market clearing, continuity of worker wages, continuity
of managerial salaries, and the zero-prot conditions. For concreteness, let us focus on the case in which
sH> 0 so that the more able managers sort to industry 1; the opposite case can be handled similarly.
It proves convenient to dene eHi (qH)= q
i=(1 i)
H as the e¤ective managerial input of a manager with
ability qH who works in sector i. Then the aggregate supplies of e¤ective managerial input in sectors 1 and
2 are
H1= H
Z qHmax
qH
q
1
1 1
H H (qH) dqH ; (16)
and
H2= H
Z qH
qHmin
q
2
1 2
H H (qH) dqH , (17)
respectively. Note that H1= H depends only on qH and is a monotonically decreasing function, and H2= H
also depends only on qH and is monotonically increasing.
Consider now the supply and demand for e¤ective labor in sector 1, where we dene eLi (qL)= q
i=i
L
as the e¤ective labor provided by a worker of ability qL in sector i. From the labor demand equation (11), a
rm in sector 1 combines a manager with eHi units of e¤ective managerial input with eHi (ipi=wi)
1=(1 i)
units of e¤ective labor. Therefore, the H1 units of e¤ective managerial input that are hired into sector 1 are
combined with H1 (1p1=w1)
1=(1 1) units of e¤ective labor. Noting the denition of H1 and equating the
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demand for e¤ective labor in sector 1 with the supply of e¤ective labor among those with ability above qL,
we have
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A similar condition applies in sector 2, where labor-market clearing requires
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Continuity of the wage schedule at qL requires that
w1 (q

L)
1
1 = w2 (q

L)
2
2 . (20)
The salary function for managers must also be continuous and rms that hire managers with ability qH must
earn zero prots in either sector. Together, these considerations imply
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Equations (18)-(21) comprise four equations that can be used to solve for the two wage anchors, w1 and
w2, and the two cuto¤s, qL and q

H . The e¤ective supply of managers in sectors 1 and 2, H1 and H2, can
then be solved from (16) and (17). Finally, the salary anchors for the managers can be computed from the
zero-prot conditions, which imply
ri= ip
1
1 i
i w
  i
1 i
i for i = 1; 2: (22)
This completes our characterization of the supply-side equilibrium for an economy that faces prices p1 and
p2.
Proofs for Section 4.2
Consider strictly log-supermodular productivity, i.e., Assumption 1 holds. Substituting the optimal
labor supply (2) into the gross prot function i(`; qL; qH) and deducting manager salaries yields net prot
~i (qH ; qL)= ip
1
1 i
i  i (qH ; qL)
1
1 i w (qL)
  i
1 i  r (qH) , where 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i
1 i
i (1  i) : (23)
The rm identies the most suitable workers to combine with the manager, taking the continuous and strictly
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increasing wage schedule as given.35 This yields a prot function,
i (qH)= max
qL2SL
~i (qH ; qL) , (24)
for qH2 SH ; i = 1; 2. This prot function describes a rms prots per manager when it hires mangers of
ability qH and optimizes the choice of workers. Finally, the rm selects qH to maximize i (qH), given the
continuous and strictly increasing salary schedule, r (qH).36 In equilibrium
max
qH2QHi
i (qH)= 0 and max
qH2SH
i (qH) 0; (25)
where QHi is the set of types of managers that sort into sector i. Firms break even when among the mangers
that sort into their sector they hire those that bring about the highest prots, and their prots cannot be
raised by hiring mangers from the other sector.
Denote by mi (qH) the solution set to problem (24). Because SL and SH are compact, mi (qH) is upper
hemicontinuous (because ~i (qL; qH) is a continuous function), and mi (qH) is closed-valued, the graph
Gi = [fqH ; qLg j qL 2 mi (qH) for all qH 2 SH ]
is closed. The matching correspondence satises
m (qH) =
(
m1 (qH) for qH 2 QH1 ;
m2 (qH) for qH 2 QH2 ;
and the equilibrium allocation graph in sector i is
Mi = [fqH ; qLg j qL 2 mi (qH) for all qH 2 QHi]  Gi:
Since QHi  SH , the graph Mi is also closed.
Now consider a connected subset Mni Mi:
Mni = [fqH ; qLg j qL 2 mi (qH) for all qH 2 [qH1; qH2]  QHi] :
Since Mi is a closed graph, such a subset exists and there exists an interval [qL1; qL2], qL2 > qL1, that
satises both (i) mi (qH) 2 [qL1; qL2] for all qH 2 [qH1; qH2] and (ii) for every point qL 2 [qL1; qL2] there
exists a managerial ability level qH 2 [qH1; qH2] satisfying qL 2 mi (qH). This means that, in Mni , workers
of ability [qL1; qL2] are matched with managers of ability [qH1; qH2] and all workers and managers have
matches. Then, as Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) have shown, strict log supermodularity of  i () ensures
35The strict monotonicity of the wage function follows from the strict monotonicity of the productivity functions
 i (qH ; qL); if wages were declining over some range of abilities, all rms would prefer to hire the most able workers
in this range. The continuity of the wage function follows from the continuity of the productivity function; if wages
were to jump at some q0L, rms would strictly prefer workers with ability a shade below q
0
L to workers with ability a
shade above q0L, because the former would be only slightly less productive but would cost discretely less. Below we
also prove that the wage function must be di¤erentiable in the interior of the ability range employed by an industry.
36The salary schedule must be continuous and strictly increasing for the same reason that the wage schedule must
be continuous and strictly increasing.
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strict positive assortative matching (PAM) between the factors allocated to sector i. It follows thatmi (qH) is
a continuous and strictly increasing function in the interior of [qH1; qH2]. Mi consists of a union of connected
sets, Mi = [n2NiMni , such that mi (qH) is continuous and strictly increasing in each such set and mi (qH)
jumps upwards between them.
We now establish the di¤erentiability of w () in Mn;inti .37 Let m 1 () be the inverse of the sectoral
matching function in Mn;inti . Since m () is continuous and strictly increasing in Mn;inti , this inverse exists.
Now consider an interval [q0L; q
0
L + dqL) 2Mn;inti . The zero-prot condition (7) implies
w (q0L) = 
1 i
i
i p
1
i
i  i

m 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L
 1
i r

m 1 (q0L)
  1 ii
and prot maximization implies
w (q0L + dqL)  
1 i
i
i p
1
i
i  i

m 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L + dqL
 1
i r

m 1 (q0L)
  1 ii :
Together, these expressions imply
w (q0L + dqL)  w (q0L)
(
 i

m 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L + dqL

 i [m
 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L]
) 1
i
: (26)
Similarly, (7) implies
w (q0L + dqL) = 
1 i
i
i p
1
i
i  i

m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L + dqL
 1
i r

m 1 (q0L + dqL)
  1 ii
and prot maximization implies
w (q0L)  
1 i
i
i p
1
i
i  i

m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L
 1
i r

m 1 (q0L + dqL)
  1 ii :
Together, these expressions imply
w (q0L)  w (q0L + dqL)
(
 i

m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L

 i [m
 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L + dqL]
) 1
i
: (27)
Inequalities (26) and (27) jointly imply
w (q0L)
 i [m
 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L]
1
i
24 i m 1 (q0L) ; q0L + dqL 1i    i m 1 (q0L) ; q0L 1i
dqL
35  w (q0L + dqL)  w (q0L)
dqL
 w (q
0
L)
 i [m
 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L]
1
i
24 i m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q0L + dqL 1i    i m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q0L 1i
dqL
35 :
Since the productivity function is continuous, strictly increasing, and di¤erentiable, and since the inverse of
the sectoral matching function is continuous and strictly increasing in this range, taking the limit as dqL ! 0
37This proof is similar to the proof of di¤erentiability of the wage function in Sampson (2014).
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implies that the derivative of w () at q0L exists and
dw (q0L)
dqL
=
w (q0L)
 i [m
 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L]
1
i
@ i

m 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L
 1
i
@qL
:
Similar arguments can be used to show that the salary function is di¤erentiable.
We now prove Proposition 2 by contradiction. (Proposition 1 can be proved similarly.) To this end,
suppose that the inequality condition holds, but the equilibrium is such that there are managers employed
in sector j who have greater ability than some managers employed in sector i. In such circumstances,
there exists an ability level ~qH at one of the boundaries between QHi and QHj such that managers with
ability in (~qH   "i; ~qH)QintHi are employed in sector i and managers with ability (~qH ; ~qH + "j) QintHj are
employed in sector j, for "i > 0 and "j > 0 small enough. Moreover, the equilibrium conditions (6)-(9) are
satised, the matching function m (qH) is continuous at QintHi and Q
int
Hj close to ~qH (but can be discontinuous
at the boundary point between these sets), the wage function w (qL) is continuous and increasing in SL
and di¤erentiable in QintLi and Q
int
Lj , and the salary function r (qH) is continuous and increasing in SH and
di¤erentiable in QintHi and Q
int
Hj .
Now recall the continuous prot function i (qH) dened in (24). In equilibrium, i (qH) = 0 for all
qH 2 QHi, but the maximal prots i (qH) may di¤er from zero for qH =2 QHi. Therefore i (qH) = 0 for
all qH 2 (~qH   "i; ~qH) and, by continuity, limqH%~qH i (qH) = 0.
Next consider the prots that would accrue to an entrepreneur that hires a manager with ability ~qH + "
in order to produce good i, where " < "j . Choosing workers so as to maximize prots, this entrepre-
neur earns i (~qH + ")  ~i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

, where m
 
~q H

= lim"&0m (~qH   ") and lim"&0i (~qH + ") =
lim"&0 ~i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

= 0. The rst-order approximation to ~i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

is
~i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H
  "~iH ~qH + ";m  ~q H ;
where ~iH () is the partial derivative of ~i () with respect to qH . This derivative exists because the salary
function is di¤erentiable in QintHj , and
~iH

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

= ip
1
1 i
i  i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H
 1
1 i w

m
 
~q H
  i1 i  iH ~qH + ";m  ~q H
(1  i) i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H
   r0 (~qH + ")
=
(
 i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

 i

~qH ;m
 
~q H
 ) 11 i r  ~q H  iH ~qH + ";m  ~q H(1  i) i ~qH + ";m  ~q H   r0 (~qH + ") ;
where the last equality uses the free-entry condition (7), which applies to sector 1 at points in QintHi in the
conjectured equilibrium, and r
 
~q H

= r (~qH) due to the continuity of the salary function. Since ~qH+" 2 QintHj ,
condition (8) implies
lim
"&0
~iH

~qH + ";mi
 
~q H

= r (~qH)
(
 iH

qH ;mi
 
~q H

(1  i) i

qH ;mi
 
~q H
    jH qH ;m  ~q+H 
1  j

 j

qH ;m
 
~q+H
) ;
where m
 
~q+H

= lim"&0m (~qH + "). It now follows from the supposition of Proposition 2 that the right-hand
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Figure 14: Matching function with discontinuity
side of this equation is strictly positive irrespective of the values of mi
 
~q H

and m
 
~q+H

, and therefore that
~iH

~qH + ";mi
 
~q H

> 0 for " small enough, which contradicts the zero-prot condition as prots rise above
zero. This contradicts the supposition that in equilibrium there are managers employed in sector j who are
more able than some managers employed in sector i. Consequently, every manager in sector i has greater
ability than any manager employed in sector j. This completes the proof.
Next we prove Proposition 3. Suppose that the inequality conditions in Proposition 3 hold but the
equilibrium is such that there exist managers in sector 2 who are more able than some managers in sector 1.
In such circumstances, there exists an ability ~qH at one of the boundary points between QH1 and QH2 such
that managers of ability ~qH   "1 are employed in sector 1 and managers of ability ~qH + "2 are employed in
sector 2 for "1 > 0 and "2 > 0 small enough. Let m(~q
 
H) = limqH%~qH m(qH) and m(~q
+
H) = limqH&~qH m(qH)
Then
lim
"!0
~iH

~qH + ";m(q
 
H)

= r (~qH)
"
 1H

~qH ;m(~q
 
H)

(1  1) 1

~qH ;m(~q
 
H)
    2H ~qH ;m  ~q+H
(1  2) 2

~qH ;m
 
~q+H
# ; (28)
which we derive in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2. Under the supposition that the managers
to the left of ~qH sort into sector 1 and those to the right of ~qH sort into sector 2 the partial derivative in
(28) cannot be positive and therefore
 1H

~qH ;m(~q
 
H)

(1  1) 1

~qH ;m(~q
 
H)
   2H ~qH ;m  ~q+H
(1  2) 2

~qH ;m
 
~q+H
 :
In view of the rst inequality in Proposition 3 and the strict log supermodularity of the productivity function,
this inequality implies m
 
~q+H

> m
 
~q H

. That is, the matching function is discontinuous at ~qH and it jumps
upwards there. As a result, there must exist an ability level for workers qL 2

m
 
~q H

;m
 
~q+H

such that
workers in the range (qL   "1; qL) are employed in sector 1 and workers in the range (qL; qL + "2) are employed
in sector 2; for "1 and "2 small enough. Due to the upward jump of the matching function and due to PAM
in each sector, in this range of worker types the ability of managers matched with workers in sector 1 must be
strictly greater than the ability of managers matched with workers in sector 2. This is illustrated in Figure
7
14. At point A; we have qH = ~qH and the matching function exhibits an upward jump from point A to C.
The supposition is that managers to the left of A sort into sector 1 and managers to the right of A sort into
sector 2, as illustrated in the gure. Clearly, workers with ability between points A and C must be matched
with managers in some sector. Segment x illustrates a possible matching of these workers with high-ability
managers. It is not possible for x to be sector 2, however, because this would imply non-monotonic matching
in this sector, which is ruled out by the strict log supermodularity of the productivity function there. So
x must be sector 1. In this case, qL is the ability of workers at point C. Workers with ability just below
C are employed in sector 1 and workers with ability just above C are employed in sector 2. Evidently, the
ability of managers with whom these workers are matched in sector 1 is higher than the ability of managers
with whom their slightly better peers are matched in sector 2. It can be seen from the gure that a similar
outcome obtains if the matching along x is to the left of point A, except that in this case x stands for sector
2 and qL is the ability of workers at point A. Evidently, in this case too, at points around qL the ability of
managers matched with workers in sector 1 is higher than the ability of managers matched with workers in
sector 2.
In short, consider the inverse function m 11 (qL) for qL 2 (qL   "1; qL); this inverse exists in the specied
range because m1 (qH) is continuous and strictly increasing at points in (~qH   "; ~qH) for " small enough.
Similarly, consider the inverse functionm 12 (qL) for qL 2 (qL; qL + "2); this inverse also exists in the specied
range because m2 (qH) is continuous and strictly increasing at points in (~qH ; ~qH + ") for " small enough.
Moreover, under the supposition of our sorting pattern m 1 (qL) = m 11 (qL) for qL 2 (qL   "1; qL) and
m 1 (qL) = m 12 (qL) for qL 2 (qL; qL + "2) and the argument in the previous paragraph showed that
m 1 (qL) = m 11 (qL) > m
 1 (q0L) = m
 1
2 (q
0
L) for qL 2 (qL   "1; qL) and q0L 2 (qL; qL + "2). Taking limits as
"1;"2 & 0, this implies that m 1
 
q L

> m 1
 
q+L

:
Next, following steps similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 2, which considered the response of
prots to variations in the ability of managers at points around ~qH , an analysis of the response of prots to
variations in the ability of workers at points around qL establishes that a necessary condition for optimality
is
 1L

m 1
 
q L

; qL

1 1

m 1
 
q L

; qL
   2L m 1  q+L  ; qL
2 2

m 1
 
q+L

; qL
 :
In view of the second inequality in Proposition 3 and the strict log supermodularity of the productivity
function, this inequality implies m 1
 
q+L

= m 12
 
q+L

> m 11
 
q L

= m 1
 
q L

, which contradicts the
above established result that m 11
 
q L

> m 12
 
q+L

. It follows that the best managers sort into sector 1.
By symmetrical arguments the best workers also sort into sector 1:
Proofs for Section 5
Assume that Assumption 1holds and suppose that some sector employs workers and managers whose
abilities form the intervals IL = [qLa; qLb] and IH = [qHa; qHb], respectively. To simplify notation, we drop
the sectoral index i and denote qH by q, and we consider the following industry equilibrium conditions
corresponding to (7) - (9) for one particular sector:
r (q) = p
1
1   [q;m (q)]
1
1  w [m (q)]
  1  ;  = 

1  (1  ) (29)
8
 L [q;m (q)]
 [q;m (q)]
=
w0 [m (q)]
w [m (q)]
; (30)
H
r (q)
(1  )w [m (q)]H (q) =
LL [m (q)]m
0 (q) ; (31)
and the boundary conditions,
m (qHz) = qLz, z = a; b; (32)
qLb > qLa > 0; qHb > qHa > 0:
Equation (29) is taken from (7), (30) is taken from (6) and (31) is taken from (9). We seek to characterize
the solution for the three functions, w (), r () and m ().
We use (29) and (30) to obtain
ln r (qH)  ln r (qH0) =
Z qH
qH0
 H [x;m (x)]
(1  ) [x;m (x)]dx; for qH ; qH0 2 IH ; (33)
lnw (qL)  lnw (qL0) =
Z qL
qL0
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx; for qL; qL0 2 IL; (34)
where  () is the inverse of m (). We substitute (29) into (31) to obtain
1
1   lnw [m (q)] =
1
1   ln  + ln
 H
L

+
1
1   ln p (35)
+
1
1   ln [q;m (q)] + log H (q)  log L [m (q)]  logm
0 (q) :
The di¤erential equations (30) and (35) together with the boundary conditions (32) uniquely determine the
solution of w () and m () when the productivity function  () is twice continuously di¤erentiable and the
density functions F (), F = H;L, are continuously di¤erentiable.
By di¤erentiating (35) and substituting (30) into the result, we generate a second-order di¤erential
equation for the matching function,
m00 (q)
m0 (q)
=
 H [q;m (q)]
(1  ) [q;m (q)]  
 L [q;m (q)]m
0 (q)
 [q;m (q)]
+
0H (q)
H (q)
  
0
L [m (q)]m
0 (q)
L [m (q)]
: (36)
Given boundary conditions m (q0) = qL0, m0 (q0) = t0 > 0; this di¤erential equation has a unique solution,
which may or may not satisfy the boundary conditions (32). The solution to the original matching problem
is found by identifying a value ta such that m (qHa) = qLa and m0 (qHa) = ta yield a solution that satises
the second boundary condition m (qHb) = qLb. Note that this solution depends neither on the price p nor on
the factor endowments H and L. Therefore, changes in these variables do no a¤ect the matching function,
but they change all wages and salaries proportionately, as can be seen from (35), and (29). Using hats to
denote proportional changes, e.g., p^ = dp=p, we have
Lemma 1 (i) The matching function m () does not depend on  p; H; L. (ii) An increase in the price p,
p^ > 0, raises the wage and salary schedules proportionately by p^. (iii) An increase in H=L such that H^  L^ =
^ > 0 raises the wage schedule proportionately by (1  ) ^ and reduces the salary schedule proportionately
by ^.
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We now prove several lemmas that are used in the main analysis.
Lemma 2 Let [m{ (q) ; w{ (qL)] and [m% (q) ; w% (qL)] be solutions to the di¤erential equations (30) and
(35), each for di¤erent boundary conditions (32), such that m{ (q0) = m% (q0) = qL0 and m0% (q0) > m
0
{ (q0)
for q0 2 SH{ \ SH%. Then m% (q) > m{ (q) for all q > q0 and m% (q) < m{ (q) for all q < q0 in the
overlapping range of abilities.
Proof. Consider q > q0 and suppose that, contrary to the claim, there exists a q1 > q0 such that m% (q1) 
m{ (q1). Then di¤erentiability of m (),  = {; %, implies that there exists q2 > q0 such that m% (q2) =
m{ (q2), m% (q) > m{ (q) for all q 2 (q0; q2) and m0% (q2) < m0{ (q2). This also implies % (x) < { (x)
for all x 2 (m% (q0) ;m% (q2)), where  () is the inverse of m (). Under these conditions (35) implies
w% [m% (q0)] < w{ [m% (q0)] and w% [m% (q2)] > w{ [m% (q2)], and therefore
w{ [m% (q2)]  w{ [m% (q0)] < w% [m% (q2)]  w% [m% (q0)] :
On the other hand, (34) implies
lnw [m% (q2)]  lnw [m% (q0)] =
Z m%(q2)
m%(q0)
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx;  = {; %:
Together with the previous inequality, this givesZ m%(q2)
m%(q0)
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx <
Z m%(q2)
m%(q0)
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
 dx:
Note, however, that strict log supermodularity of  () and % (x) < { (x) for all x 2 (m% (q0) ;m% (q2))
imply the reverse inequality, a contradiction. It follows that m% (q) > m{ (q) for all q > q0. A similar
argument shows that m% (q) < m{ (q) for all q < q0.
The key implication of this lemma is that changes in the boundary conditions (32) shift the matching
function in such a way as to generate at most one point in common with the original matching function. We
next show how the matching function and wage function respond to the boundary conditions. To this end,
re-consider Figure 6 in the main text. Let the thick curve between points a and b represent the solution
to the matching function when points a and b are the boundary points (32). Now consider the shift of the
equilibrium matching function in response to a rise in qLb; that is, the end point b shifts upward to b0. Since
point a is common to the old and new matching function, Lemma 2 implies that the two curves can have no
additional points in common, which implies that the new inverse matching function represented by the thin
curve between points a and b0 is everywhere above the old one. It follows that an increase in qLb increases
the ability of workers matched with every manager except for the least able manager. Other shifts in the
boundary points can be analyzed in similar fashion to establish
Lemma 3 (i) dm (qH) =dqLa > 0 for all qH < qHb and d (qL) =dqLa < 0 for all qL < qLb; (ii) dm (qH) =dqLb >
0 for all qH > qHa and d (qL) =dqLb < 0 for all qL > qLa; (iii) d (qL) =dqHa > 0 for all qL < qLb and
dm (qH) =dqHa < 0 for all qH < qHb; and (iv) d (qL) =dqHb > 0 for all qL > qLa and dm (qH) =dqHb < 0 for
all qH > qHa.
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The rule that emerges from this lemma is that an improvement in the ability of workers at a boundary
of IL improves the quality of the matches for all the managers (except those at the other boundary) and
deteriorates the quality of the matches for all the workers (except those at the other boundary). Similarly,
an improvement in the ability of managers at a boundary of IH improves the quality of the matches for all
workers (except those at the other boundary) and deteriorates the quality of the matches for all the managers
(except those at the other boundary).
Next consider changes in a boundary (qHz; qLz), z = a; b. For concreteness, suppose that (qHb; qLb)
changes. Then the new matching function coincides with the old one at the other boundary point, (qHa; qLa),
which has not changed. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that either the two matching functions coincide in
the overlapping range of abilities or one is above the other everywhere except for at (qHa; qLa). A similar
argument applies to changes in (qHa; qLa). We therefore have:
Lemma 4 In response to a shift in a single boundary (qHz; qLz), z = a; b, either the new matching functions
coincide with the old matching function in the overlapping range of abilities or one matching function is above
the other everywhere except for at the opposite boundary point.
We next discuss the impact of boundaries on wages and salaries. We focus on wages, but note that if
a shift in boundaries raises the wage of workers with ability qL then it must reduce the salary of managers
teamed with these workers. This can be seen from (29) by noting that a change in boundaries has no impact
on r () through an induced shift in the matching function due to the rst-order condition (30) (a version of
the Envelope Theorem). Therefore the change in salary r (q) is driven by the change in wages of workers
matched with managers of ability q. We record this result in
Lemma 5 Suppose that the boundaries (qHz; qLz), z = a; b, change and that, as a result, w (qL) rises
for some qL such that qL and q = m 1 (qL) are in the overlapping range of abilities of the old and new
boundaries. Then r (q) declines.
For the subsequent analysis the following lemma is useful:
Lemma 6 Let [m{ (q) ; w{ (qL)] and [m% (q) ; w% (qL)] be solutions to the di¤erential equations (30) and
(35), each for di¤erent boundary conditions (32), such that m{ (q0) = m% (q0) = qL0 and m0% (q0) > m
0
{ (q0)
for some q0 2 SL{ \ SL%, and let r% (q) and r{ (q) be the corresponding solutions to (29). Then w% (qL) <
w{ (qL) and r% (q) > r{ (q) in the overlapping range of abilities.
Proof. From Lemma 2 we know that m% (q) > m{ (q) for all q > q0 and m% (q) < m{ (q) for all q < q0 in
the overlapping range of abilities and % (x) < { (x) for all x > qL0 and % (x) > { (x) for all x < qL0 in
the overlapping range of abilities. Moreover, m0% (q0) > m
0
{ (q0) and (35) imply
lnw{ (qL0) > lnw% (qL0)
while (34) implies
lnw (qL)  lnw (qL0) =
Z qL
qL0
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx;  = {; %:
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Together, these inequalities imply
lnw{ (qL)  lnw% (qL) >
Z qL
qL0
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx 
Z qL
qL0
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
dx
=
Z qL0
qL
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
dx  Z qL0
qL
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx:
For qL > qL0 the right-hand side of the rst line is positive due to the strict log supermodularity of the
productivity function and % (x) < { (x) for all x > qL0, and the second line also is positive for qL < qL0
due to the strict log supermodularity of the productivity function and % (x) > { (x) for all x < qL0. It
follows that w{ (qL) > w% (qL) for all qL in the overlapping range of abilities. A similar argument establishes
that r{ (q) < r% (q) for all q in the overlapping range of abilities.
This lemma, together with Lemma 4, have straightforward implications for the impact of boundary
points on the wage and salary functions.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the lower boundary (qHa; qLa) changes and the matching function shifts upwards
as a result. Then salaries decline and wages rise in the overlapping range of abilities. The converse holds
when the matching function shifts downwards.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the upper boundary (qHb; qLb) changes and the matching function shifts upwards
as a result. Then salaries rise and wages decline in the overlapping range of abilities. The converse holds
when the matching function shifts downwards.
Not only do wages and salaries shift in a predictable way in response to a shift in a boundary point,
the inequality of wages and of salaries also change in predictable ways. From (34) we see that a change in
boundaries that shifts upwards the matching function reduces wage inequality, because for every two ability
levels the ratio of the wage of a high-ability worker to the wage of a low-ability worker declines for all types
in the overlapping range. For salaries it is the opposite, as one can see from (33). We therefore have
Lemma 7 Suppose that the matching function shifts upwards in response to a shift in the boundaries (32).
Then wage inequality narrows and salary inequality widens. The opposite is true when the matching function
shifts downwards.
Proofs for Section 6.1
Consider the two-sector economy for the case of Cobb-Douglas productivity under Assumption 1, and
adopt the label for the two sectors such that sH= 1= (1  1) 2= (1  2)> 0: We establish
Proposition 7 Suppose that sH  0. When p^1 > 0, (i) w^1 > w^2; (ii) if 1  2, then w^1 > p^1 >
r^1  r^2 > 0 > w^2; (iii) if 1 > 2 and sL  0, then w^1  w^2 > p^1 > 0 > r^1  r^2; (iv) if 1 < 2 and
sL  0, then r^1  r^2 > p^1 > 0 > w^1  w^2.
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Proof. Di¤erentiating the equilibrium system (18)-(21), we obtain0BBBB@
1  1 sL 0
  11 1
2
1 2 0 sH
0 E21 2 2  2
E1
1 1 0  1 1
1CCCCA
0BBB@
w^1
w^2
q^L
q^H
1CCCA =
0BBBB@
0
  11 1
0
E1
1 1
1CCCCA p^1;
where Ei is e¤ective labor in sector i, dened as
E1 = H

1p1
w1
 1
1 1
Z qHmax
qH
q
1
1 1
H H (qH) dqH ;
E2 = H

2p2
w2
 1
1 2
Z qH
qHmin
q
2
1 2
H H (qH) dqH ;
and
1 = L (q

L)
1
1
+1
L (q

L) ;
2 = L (q

L)
2
2
+1
L (q

L) ;
1 = H

1p1
w1
 1
1 1
(qH)
1
1 1+1 H (q

H) ;
2 = H

2p2
w2
 1
1 2
(qH)
2
1 2+1 H (q

H) :
The determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side of this system, DCD, satises
(1  2) (1  1) ( DCD) = (12  21) (1   2) + sH [1E2 (1  1) + 2E1 (1  2)]
+sL (11E2 +22E1) + E1E2sHsL:
Using the equilibrium conditions (20) and (21), we nd that
(12  21) (1   2) = 21
(1   2)2
2 (1  1)
> 0:
Therefore DCD < 0. We also compute
w^1 (1  2) (1  1) ( DCD) = (12  21 + 2E1sH) (1  2) p^1
+ [(1E2 +22E1) sL + E1E2sHsL] p^1;
w^2 (1  1) ( DCD) = (12  21 + 2E1sH  2E1sL) p^1:
Therefore,
(w^1   w^2) (1  1) (1  2) ( DCD) = [(1E2 +22E1) sL + E1E2sHsL +2E1sL (1  2)] p^1.
Since DCD < 0, it follows that an increase in the price of good 1 results in w^1 > w^2, which proves part (i)
of Proposition 7.
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Next, consider the case in which sH  0 and 1  2. In this case,
(1  2) (1  1) ( DCD)  sL (11E2 +22E1) :
Then
w^1   w^2  1E2 +2E1
11E2 +22E1
p^1;
because 1  2 implies 12 21  0. Evidently, in this case, w^1 > p^1 > 0 > w^2. To complete the proof
of part (ii) of Proposition 7, we need to calculate the response of the anchors r1 and r2 for the managers
salaries. When p1 rises, (22) yields r^1 = (1  1) 1 p^1   1 (1  1) 1 w^1 and r^2 =  2 (1  2) 1 w^2. In
case (ii) of Proposition 7, with sH  0 and 1  2, these imply
r^1   r^2  22E1
11E2 +22E1
p^1:
It follows that p^1 > r^1  r^2 > 0. So, part (ii) of the proposition is proved.
We turn now to parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 7. The antecedents sH  0 and sL  0 imply
(1  2) (1  1) ( DCD)  (12  21) (1   2) ;
w^1 (1  1) ( DCD)  (12  21) p^1;
w^2 (1  1) ( DCD)  (12  21) p^1:
It follows that
w^1   w^2  1  2
1   2
p^1;
which implies that w^1  w^2 > p^1 > 0 for 1 > 2 and w^1  w^2 < 0 < p^1 for 1 < 2. Moreover, since
r^1 = (1  1) 1 p^1   1 (1  1) 1 w^1 and r^2 =  2 (1  2) 1 w^2, we have
r^1   r^2    2
1   2
p^1:
Evidently, in this case, r^1  r^2 < 0 < p^1 when 1 > 2 and r^1  r^2 > p^1 > 0 when 1 < 2. This completes
the proof of Proposition 7.
Proofs for Section 6.2
Consider a two-sector economy with strictly log-supermodular productivity under Assumption 1. We
rst prove the result for an HH=LL equilibrium and then for an HL=LH equilibrium. We label sectors such
that the best workers sort into sector 1.
HH=LL Equilibrium
In an HH=LL equilibrium the cuto¤s fqH ; qLg satisfy:
w1 (q

L) = w2 (q

L) ; (37)
r1 (q

H) = r2 (q

H) ; (38)
where [wi () ; ri () ;mi ()] is a solution to the single-sector di¤erential equations (30) and (35) for i = 1; 2
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with the boundary conditions
m2 (qHmin) = qLmin; m2 (q

H) = q

L; (39)
m1 (q

H) = q

L; m1 (qHmax) = qLmax: (40)
Clearly, the solutions for the wage function, the salary function, and the matching functions depend on the
parameters of the model, such as prices and factor endowments, as do the equilibrium cuto¤s fqH ; qLg. We
denote by dwi (qL) =dpi the derivative of the wage function in sector i with respect to price pi, where this
derivative accounts for the endogenous adjustments of all three functions. This derivative contrasts with
w0i (qL), which is the slope of the wage function for given parameters. We use similar notation to represent
derivatives of the salary function.
For now, we are interested in  = p2=p1 and we shall use the following elasticities
"wi; =
dwi (qL)
d (p2=p1)
 p2=p1
qL

qL=qL
; "ri; =
dri (qH)
d (p2=p1)
 p2=p1
qH

qH=qH
:
Di¤erentiating (37)-(38) with respect to  p2=p1 yields
w01 (q

L)
w1 (qL)
  w
0
2 (q

L)
w2 (qL)

dqL = "

w2;   "w1;; (41)

r01 (q

H)
r1 (qH)
  r
0
2 (q

H)
r2 (qH)

dqH = "

r2;   "r1;: (42)
The assumptions that the equilibrium is of the HH=LL type and that the best workers and managers sort
into sector 1 imply that the expressions in the square brackets are positive in both equations; that is, at the
boundary fqH ; qLg between the two sectors the slopes of the wage and salary functions have to be steeper
in sector 1 into which the more able employees sort. It follows that qL rises in response to an increase in the
relative price of sector 2 if and only if "w2; > "

w1; and the cuto¤ q

H rises if and only if "

r2; > "

r1;.
To understand the elasticities "wi; and "

ri;, note that a shift in p2=p1 impacts wages and salaries
through two channels. First, there is the direct e¤ect described in part (ii) of Lemma 1, which means that
wages and salaries grow proportionally to the price within the sector when boundaries remain unchanged.
But wages cannot increase everywhere by more in sector 2 than in sector 1, since in equilibrium the wages at
the cuto¤ type qL have to equalize across sectors. Therefore, re-matching in each sector is necessary, which
impacts in turn the wage and salary functions, as implied by Lemmas 3-6 and Corollaries 1 and 2 to Lemma
6. In other words, the impact e¤ect of a rise in the relative price of sector 2 increases the cuto¤s for both
workers and managers, but we also have to account for the induced change in matching in order to obtain
the full e¤ect. To this end, we now express the elasticities "wi; and "

ri; as follows:
"wi; = ^ + "

wiLq^

L + "

wiH q^

H ; i = 1; 2; (43)
"ri; = ^ + "

riLq^

L + "

riH q^

H ; i = 1; 2; (44)
where the rst term captures the direct e¤ect from part (ii) of Lemma 1, "wiL is the elasticity of wi () with
respect to the boundary qL through the induced re-matching (evaluated at q

L), and "

wiH
is the elasticity of
wi () with respect to the boundary qH through the induced re-matching (evaluated at qL). From (29) and
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(30) we also have
"riF =  
i
1  i
"wiF ; F = H;L; i = 1; 2: (45)
Now substitute these equations into (41) and (42) to obtain
M
HH=LL
h
 
q^L
q^H
!
=
 
p^2   p^1
p^2   p^1
!
; (46)
where
M
HH=LL
h =
0BB@ q

L

w01(q

L)
w1(qL)
  w02(qL)
w2(qL)

+ "w1L   "w2L "w1H   "w2H
2"

w2L
1 2  
1"

w1L
1 1 q

H

r01(q

H)
r1(qH)
  r02(qH)
r2(qH)

+
2"

w2H
1 2  
1"

w1H
1 1
1CCA :
From Lemmas 3-6 we have
"w1L > 0; "

w2L < 0; "

w1H < 0; "

w2H > 0:
These equations provide a solution to q^L and q^

H .
The determinant of the matrix MHH=LLh is
D
M
HH=LL
h
=

qL

w01 (q

L)
w1 (qL)
  w
0
2 (q

L)
w2 (qL)

+ "w1L   "w2L

qH

r01 (q

H)
r1 (qH)
  r
0
2 (q

H)
r2 (qH)

+

2"

w2H
1  2
  1"

w1H
1  1

qL

w01 (q

L)
w1 (qL)
  w
0
2 (q

L)
w2 (qL)

  1   2
(1  1) (1  2)
 
"w2H"

w1L   "w1H"w2L

:
The rst two terms on the right-hand side are positive. We now show that the third term also is positive. To
this end, note from Lemma 2 that if we change a single boundary and the new boundary is on the original
matching function then the new matching function coincides with the old one in the overlapping range of
abilities. Therefore, if we choose dqL = m
0
i (q

H) dq

H , where mi () is the solution of matching in sector i,
then a change in the boundary (dqH ; dq

L) does not change the wage wi (q

L). In other words,
"wiH + "

wiL"

mi = 0;
where "mi is the elasticity of mi () evaluated at qH . On the other hand, (31) implies for the HH=LL case
that
"mi =
mi
1  i
;
where
m =
Hr (qH)H (q

H) q

H
Lw (qL)L (q

L) q

L
:
Therefore,
"wiH =  
mi
1  i
"wiL:
Using this expression, we obtain
  1   2
(1  1) (1  2)
 
"w2H"

w1L   "w1H"w2L

=   (1   2)
2
m"

w1L
"w2L
(1  1)2 (1  2)2
> 0;
which proves that D
M
HH=LL
h
> 0.
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Therefore, solving (46) implies that q^L > 0 and q^

H > 0 if and only if ^ > 0. In other words, a rise in
H=L increases both cuto¤s if and only if the relative price in sector 2 increases. That is, an increase in the
relative price of good 2 raises both cuto¤s and therefore raises output in sector 2 and reduces that in sector
1.
Next consider further implications of a rise in the price of good 2 on re-matching. Since the most able
workers and the most able mangers sort into sector 1, we can use the di¤erential equations (30) and (35) for
i = 1; 2 with the boundary conditions (39) and (40) to characterize the solution to the matching functions
mi (qH) for i = 1; 2, given the equilibrium cuto¤s (qH ; q

L). An increase in p2 shifts both cuto¤s up, and
this shift in boundary changes the matching functions in each sector. Also note that the solution to the
di¤erential equations extends beyond the range of abilities of workers and mangers who sort into a sector,
so that mi (qH) can be extended to abilities that are not employed in sector i.
The rst thing to note is that due to the continuity of the wage and salary functions (31) implies:
i= (1  i)
j=
 
1  j
=m0i (qH)
m0j
 
qH
 :
Therefore the matching function is steeper in the labor intensive sector at the cuto¤ qH , and if labor intensity
is the same in both sectors then m01 (qH) = m
0
2 (q

H). Next note that if dq

L and dq

H are the changes in
the boundaries in response to p^2> 0, then:
dqL
dp2
= m0i (q

H)
dqH
dp2
+
@mi (q

H)
@p2
for i = 1; 2; (47)
where @mi (qH) =@p2 is the change in matching of a manager of ability q

H in response to the price rise.
Evidently, if 1 = 2, in which case m
0
1 (q

H) = m
0
2 (q

H), this equation implies
@m1 (q

H)
@p2
=
@m2 (q

H)
@p2
.
This implies that in Figure 10 the matching functions in both sectors shift from point b either to the right
or to the left. Therefore small changes p^2 > 0 cannot lead to a shift in matching of the ab3c type. Also
note from (47) that:
@mi (q

H)
@p2
=
@mj (q

H)
@p2
+

m0j (q

H) m0i (qH)
 dqH
dp2
:
It follows that @mi (qH) =@p2> @mj (q

H) =@p2 if an only if m
0
j (q

H)>m
0
i (q

H), or if and only if j > i.
This implies that if the matching function for qH= qH shifts in this gure to the right in one sector and to
the left in the other, the leftward shift has to be in the labor intensive sector. Finally, note that Lemma 4
implies that if @mi (qH) =@p2> 0 then @mi (qH) =@p2> 0 for all ability levels qH between q

H and the other
end point (qHmin for sector 2 and qHmax for sector 1). And if @mi (qH) =@p2< 0 then @mi (qH) =@p2< 0
for all ability levels qH between qH and the other end point.
HL=LH Equilibrium
In an HL=LH equilibrium, the cuto¤s fqH ; qLg also satisfy the continuity conditions (37) and (38), but
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the boundary conditions are di¤erent. Assuming as before that the best workers sort into sector 1, this
means that in an HL=LH equilibrium the best managers sort into sector 2 and the boundary conditions are
m1 (qHmin) = q

L; m1 (q

H) = qLmax;
m2 (q

H) = qLmin; m2 (qHmax) = q

L:
Figure 7 depicts the pattern of sorting and matching in this type of equilibrium. The more-able workers sort
into sector 1 only if
w01 (q

L)
w1 (qL)
>
w02 (q

L)
w2 (qL)
and the more-able managers sort into sector 2 only if
r01 (q

H)
r1 (qH)
<
r02 (q

H)
r2 (qH)
:
To derive the comparative statics, we use as before conditions (41) and (42), which apply in this case
too. We also can use the decomposition of elasticities (43) and (44), which still apply. Now, however, the
relationship between the elasticities of the salary and wage functions, as described by (45), does not apply,
because workers of ability qL do not pair with managers of ability q

H , as is evident from Figure 7. Instead,
from (29) and (30) we now obtain
"r1F =  
1
1  1
"maxw1F ; F = H;L;
"r2F =  
2
1  2
"minw2F ; F = H;L;
where "riF is dened in the same way as before, "
max
w1F
is the elasticity of w1 () with respect to the boundary
qF through the induced re-matching in sector 1 (evaluated at qLmax) and "
min
w2F
is the elasticity of w2 () with
respect to the boundary qF through the induced re-matching in sector 2 (evaluated at qLmin). Using these
results the system of equations (46) is replaced by
M
HL=LH
h
 
q^L
q^H
!
=
 
p^2   p^1
p^2   p^1
!
; (48)
where
M
HL=LH
h =
0BB@ q

L

w01(q

L)
w1(qL)
  w02(qL)
w2(qL)

+ "w1L   "w2L "w1H   "w2H
2"
min
w2L
1 2  
1"
max
w1L
1 1 q

H

r01(q

H)
r1(qH)
  r02(qH)
r2(qH)

+
2"
min
w2H
1 2  
1"
max
w1H
1 1
1CCA : (49)
From Lemmas 3-6, we have "w1L > 0 > "

w2L
; "w1H > 0 > "

w2H
; "r1H < 0 < "

r2H
; "r1L < 0 < "

r2L
: This
implies that both entries in the top row in (49) are strictly positive and both entries in the bottom row are
strictly negative.
The previous observations imply that a positive term p^2 p^1 either raises qL and reduces qH ; or it reduces
qL and raises q

H : The cuto¤s cannot both move in the same direction, because the e¤ect in the top row on
the left hand side of (48) would then be opposite to those in the bottom row, whereas on the right hand side
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both e¤ects have the same sign. We will show that only a rise in qL and a reduction q

H can be associated with
equilibrium responses, which implies that the determinant of MHL=LHh must be negative (DMHL=LHh
< 0).
To prove this, consider an increase in the price p2 to p02 > p2 while the price p1 stays constant. Let X1 and
X2 denote the output in each sector prior to the price change, and let X 01 and X
0
2 denote the corresponding
output after the price change. Since only prices have changed (and not endowments), under each set of
prices both the outputs (X1; X2) and (X 01; X
0
2) are feasible. Since the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient,
the value of output is maximized given prices, which implies that
p1X1 + p2X2  p1X 01 + p2X 02;
p1X1 + p
0
2X2  p1X 01 + p02X 02;
where the rst inequality states that prior to the price change the value of output is higher under production
bundle (X1; X2) than under (X 01; X
0
2); while the opposite holds after the price change. Subtracting and
rearranging gives
(p2   p02)(X2  X 02)  0;
which implies that X2  X 02: An increase in output in sector two cannot be achieved with a fall in qL and a
rise qH , because in this case there would be less worker types and less manager types in sector 2. Therefore,
an increase in the relative price of good 2 leads to a rise in qL and a reduction q

H :
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